Re-Thinking Executive Control of and Accountability for the Agency by Sheehy, Benedict & Feaver, Don
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 54, Issue 1 (Fall 2016) Article 5
Re-Thinking Executive Control of and
Accountability for the Agency
Benedict Sheehy
University of Canberra, Australia, benedict.sheehy@canberra.edu.au
Don Feaver
donfeav@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
Article
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Sheehy, Benedict and Donald Feaver. "Re-Thinking Executive Control of and Accountability for the Agency" Osgoode Hall Law Journal
54.1 (2016) : 175-224.
Re-Thinking Executive Control of and Accountability for the Agency
Abstract
The organization of many Western governments has undergone dramatic structural and procedural changes
over the past century. A large portion of public administration previously done by departments within a more
centralized structure of government has been shifted to administrative units, often referred to as “agencies”
that fall outside the constitutional core—an “agencified” model. This article investigates the historical contexts
and legal developments associated with these changes and illuminates how “agencification” has altered the
balance between executive control powers and executive accountability obligations. It examines how the
organizational changes have been addressed in both the responsible government models of the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the republican presidential model of the United States. The article
identifies a separation of accountability and control by the executive through its use of the agency and draws
conclusions with implications for constitutional law, political theory, and practice.
Keywords
Administrative agencies; Separation of powers; Government accountability
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol54/iss1/5
175
Re-Thinking Executive Control of and 
Accountability for the Agency
BENEDICT SHEEHY & DONALD FEAVER*
The organization of many Western governments has undergone dramatic structural and 
procedural changes over the past century. A large portion of public administration previously 
done by departments within a more centralized structure of government has been shifted to 
administrative units, often referred to as “agencies” that fall outside the constitutional core—
an “agencified” model. This article investigates the historical contexts and legal developments 
associated with these changes and illuminates how “agencification” has altered the balance 
between executive control powers and executive accountability obligations. It examines how 
the organizational changes have been addressed in both the responsible government models 
of the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and the republican presidential model of the 
United States. The article identifies a separation of accountability and control by the executive 
through its use of the agency and draws conclusions with implications for constitutional law, 
political theory, and practice.
L’organisation de nombreux gouvernements occidentaux a subi des changements 
structuraux et procéduriers spectaculaires depuis un siècle. Une partie importante de 
l’administration publique, qui revenait jadis aux ministères d’un gouvernement de structure 
plus centralisée, est aujourd’hui accomplie par des unités administratives indépendantes du 
noyau constitutionnel et souvent connues sous le nom d’« organismes publics ». Cet article 
enquête sur le contexte historique et l’évolution juridique associés à ces changements et 
met en lumière la manière dont l’apparition de ces organismes a perturbé l’équilibre 
entre le contrôle par le pouvoir exécutif et la responsabilité de ce même pouvoir exécutif. 
Il examine la manière dont les changements organisationnels ont été abordés tant par les 
gouvernements responsables du Royaume-Uni, du Canada et de l’Australie que par le régime 
présidentiel républicain des États-Unis. L’article identifie une distinction entre responsabilité 
et contrôle opérée par le pouvoir exécutif par son recours aux organismes publics et en tire 
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des conclusions qui touchent le droit constitutionnel, la théorie politique et les pratiques 
courantes.
THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MANY WESTERN GOVERNMENTS has 
undergone a dramatic change over the past century. This change first took 
hold with the emergence of the “administrative state” in the United States in 
the 1930s, followed in more recent decades by the rise of the “regulatory state” 
in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries.1 The structural feature common to both the administrative and the 
regulatory states is the increasing number of public administrative bodies—
referred to in this article as “agencies”—that have been created and situated 
outside the constitutionally prescribed administrative core of government.2 
1. See Donald Feaver & Benedict Sheehy, “The Political Division of Regulatory Labour: A Legal 
Theory of Agency Selection” (2015) 35:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 153 at 157 [Feaver & Sheehy, 
“The Political Division of Regulatory Labour”].
2. See ibid; Donald Feaver & Benedict Sheehy, “The Shifting Balance of Power in the 
Regulatory State: Structure, Strategy, and the Division of Labour” (2014) 41:2 JL & 
Soc’y 203 [Feaver & Sheehy, “The Shifting Balance”]; Roger Wettenhall, “Agencies and 
Non-Departmental Public Bodies: The Hard and Soft Lenses of Agencification Theory” 
(2005) 7:4 Pub Mgmt Rev 615 at 616.
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In the Commonwealth countries of Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, 
these agencies have taken over the bulk of public administrative work that was 
previously done by departments embedded within the core of government.3
Although substantial literatures in political science, public administration, 
economics, and law focus on the agency and the agencification of government, 
a deficit in understanding persists around the executive branch of government’s 
control of and accountability for the administration executed by these agencies. 
From a constitutional law perspective, the interposition of the agency into the 
administration of government altered the balance of power institutionalized in 
the classical constitutional models. Agencification was done without attention to 
the founding principles of these constitutions, which sought to strike a balance 
between the exercise of control powers on the one hand and accountability 
obligations for the exercise of those powers on the other. Rather, the agency 
evolved organically as a solution to specific technical, economic, and logistical 
imperatives in distinct historical, political, and legal contexts. The constitutional 
balance referred to, however, not only concerns the balance of powers between 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. It also refers to 
a balancing of powers between the agency and the executive. Thus, instead of 
a balanced model informing the development of the machinery or institutions 
3. See Harold Seidman & Robert Gilmour, Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive 
to the Regulatory State, 4th ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Cass R 
Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1990); Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: 
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); 
Richard H Pildes & Cass R Sunstein, “Reinventing the Regulatory State” (1995) 62:1 U 
Chicago L Rev 1; Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge, 1996); 
Martin Loughlin & Colin Scott, “The Regulatory State” in Patrick Dunleavy et al, eds, 
Developments in British Politics 5 (Hampshire, UK: Macmillan Press, 1997) 205; Julia 
Black, “Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation 
in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World” (2001) 54:1 Current Leg Probs 103; Michael Moran, “Review 
Article: Understanding the Regulatory State” (2002) 32:2 British J Political Science 391; 
Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, “The Politics of Regulation in the Age of Governance” 
in Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur, eds, The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and 
Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004); 
David Levi-Faur, “The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism” (2005) 598:1 ANNALS 
American Academy Political & Social Science 12; Karen Yeung, “The Regulatory State” in 
Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge, eds, Oxford Handbook of Regulation (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 64.
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of government, the agencified model has been described as a network of bodies, 
each separated from the core of government to varying degrees.4
Within the foregoing context, this article investigates how the changed 
structure of government in the regulatory state, the hallmark of which is the 
agency, altered the balance between executive control of and accountability for 
the administrative arm of government. Canadian administrative law scholar, 
John Willis, presaged this problem some eight decades ago.5 The article asks how 
agencification has affected the balance of power between the three constitutionally 
defined branches of government, and how it has impacted the accountability 
relationship between elected officials and the electorate.
In summary, the administrative and regulatory state’s agencified model of 
government treats control and accountability as separate and distinct issues rather 
than as mutual and interdependent power relations. The outcome is a structural 
separation of control power and accountability obligations that undermines 
the constitutional balance of powers—a formula of “equilibrated powers”6 
underlying both the classical responsible government and presidential republican 
constitutional models. Unsurprisingly, this separation of accountability 
and control has led to a variety of issues with respect to agency control and 
accountability, which have spawned a literature of their own. We argue, however, 
that the agency is not at the core of the problem. In fact, scholars acknowledge 
that a strict separation of powers doctrine has posed an insurmountable obstacle 
to the effective administration of governments since at least the mid-nineteenth 
century.7 It may be argued from this perspective that a great amount of the 
research on agency autonomy or independence and accountability misses the 
point. The point, as argued in this article, is the level of accountability of the 
executive for the exercise of its control over agencies. In brief, the research to 
4. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Distributed Public 
Governance: Agencies, Authorities and Other Government Bodies (Paris: OECD, 2002); 
Sol Picciotto, “Regulatory Networks and Global Governance” (2006) [unpublished, archived 
at University of London Institute of Advanced Legal Studies]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “The 
Accountability of Government Networks” (2001) 8:2 Ind J Global Leg Stud 347.
5. See “Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the 
Functional” (1935) 1:1 UTLJ 53 at 59. Willis writes, “The practical problem is how to fit 
into our constitutional structure these new institutions whose growth seems inevitable.”
6. See Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 at 2625, 108 S Ct 2597 (1988).
7. In the United States, see e.g. Candace H Beckett, “Separation of Powers and Federalism: 
Their Impact on Individual Liberty and the Functioning of Our Government” (1988) 
29:3 Wm & Mary L Rev 635 at 635-36. In the United Kingdom, see criticisms of Dicey 
glossing over the issue in Arthurs’ article. See HW Arthurs, “Rethinking Administrative Law: 
A Slightly Dicey Business” (1979) 17:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 6 [Arthurs].
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date has left a significant gap with respect to accountability and control of the 
executive branch of government in relation to its control over the agencies, and it 
is this gap that the article seeks to address.
Perhaps the main reason for this gap is the myth or misconception that 
agencies are somehow autonomous—i.e., free to a greater or lesser degree of 
executive control. We argue to the contrary: Agency autonomy is limited and 
agencies are subject to extensive executive control. Indeed, we demonstrate that 
although the agency is a post-constitutional part of government, it has been 
integrated into government by the judiciary and legislature—albeit on an ad 
hoc basis over a period of decades. This ad hoc integration, however, has had 
unforeseen consequences and in part, has led to the creation of a disequilibrium 
between the executive’s legal and political powers to control agency action on the 
one hand, and accountability for its exercise of these control powers on the other. 
While initially the balance appears to have been overlooked, whether the balance 
has been neglected by design or inadvertence under the current agencified model 
is a separate matter not addressed in this article.8 What we do argue, however, 
is that the post-constitutional ad hoc integration of the agency and its increased 
use in the regulatory state has empowered the executive because the integration 
process ignored the substantive foundational principles of constitutional design 
that sought to balance control powers with accountability obligations.
As noted, the agency was the product of ad hoc pragmatics and evolution rather 
than an integral part of the institutional design of government. Unsurprisingly, 
its connection to the institutions of government and the consequences for 
balanced governance powers were neglected in its creation and on-going use. 
The constitutions establishing the governance institutions of the various 
jurisdictions considered in this article (the United Kingdom, United States, 
Canada, and Australia) were created upon consideration of the various issues and 
risks associated with governance—namely power, tyranny, and accountability. 
In the process different models were advanced and thoroughly tested in debate 
and practice. By contrast, the agency appeared simply as an ad hoc, pragmatic 
solution. These different development processes have had significant implications 
for the ongoing implementation of first principles of governance, from issues 
such as rule of law and procedural fairness to matters of balance of powers among 
the governing institutions that make up the three branches of government.
This article addresses the foregoing issues using a conceptual framework 
or paradigm9 that does not address contemporary concerns of practice the way 
8. We have argued this in Feaver & Sheehy, “The Shifting Balance,” supra note 2.
9. See Willis, supra note 5.
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public administration or political science does. Rather, following legal and 
historical analysis, it highlights the conceptual gaps and inconsistencies and links 
those gaps and inconsistencies to contemporary issues, among other things.
The article is divided into six parts. Part I of the article examines the ideas 
and problems of control and accountability and then lays out the background of 
the overall problem of the separation of accountability and control. The second 
part provides a historically informed account of constitutional design, explicating 
how control and accountability of the executive branch of government were 
intertwined in two distinct classical models: the Commonwealth responsible 
government model and the American presidential republican model.
The third part of the article examines the rise of the agency in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Although the constitutional 
structure of government is different in each country, there are clear common 
patterns. Most importantly, the executive exercise of its authority to control 
agencies under the agencified model is treated as separate from executive 
accountability. This argument is put forward in depth in relation to the 
republican and responsible government models in the fourth and fifth parts, 
respectively. The final part of the article provides a synthesis of the discussion, 
showing that the separation of control and accountability found in the agencified 
model explains the rise of the increasingly empowered—but increasingly 
unaccountable—executive.
I. CONTROL, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
GOVERNMENT
Western political history, from ancient times to the present, is marked by the 
conflict between those who assert a right to exercise power and those who 
struggle to hold those who exercise power accountable for its use and abuse. 
The tension between these competing demands in the Anglo context extends 
well back in history, to before the signing of the Magna Carta and the Acts of 
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Settlement.10 To the extent that the struggle ever achieved any semblance of 
balance, it can be argued that such balance occurred in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries in the constitutional institutions embodied in the 
responsible and republican models of government of that era (together referred 
to as the “classical models”).11 In these models, the balance between control and 
accountability is evident in both the structures of government they establish and 
in the distribution and allocation of rights and duties within those structures.
The balance is manifest in the intricate combination of political norms and 
conventions with the legal doctrines that comprise constitutional law and bear 
upon its interpretation.12 In fact, the two classical models achieve a functional 
balance between control powers and accountability obligations13 through such 
a subtle weaving of legal and political norms that it is easy to overlook how 
this balance acted as the foundation of both of these models.14 The argument is 
not a nostalgic view of some long gone golden era. Rather, it is that the design 
of the institutions of government of that era was more suited to their time. 
These institutions became constitutions that were overtaken by events leading 
to the issues that are the topic of this article. Before turning to these structures, 
however, an examination of the terms “accountability” and “control” must be 
undertaken. Clearly, the meanings of both accountability and control depend 
10. The Anglo context refers to the Commonwealth countries and the United States. See George 
H Sabine & Thomas Landon Thorson, A History of Political Theory, 4th ed (Hinsdale, Ill: 
Dryden Press, 1973) at 484. Sabine & Thorson observe that:
The medieval tradition that reached Locke through Hooker, . . . held that government—the 
king specifically but not less parliament itself and every political agency—is responsible to the 
people or the community which it governs; its power is limited both by moral law and by the 
constitutional traditions and conventions inherent in the history of the realm.
 See also Willis, supra note 5.
11. See David Held, Models of Democracy, 3d ed (Stanford: Polity Press, 2006). Held 
provides a description of the structural characteristics of the different models of 
democratic governments.
12. See Geoffrey Marshall & Graeme C Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution, 5th ed 
(London, UK: Hutchinson University Library, 1971); Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional 
Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984).
13. We are not arguing that the balance is perfect in a proportional sense but simply that some 
functional balance exists.
14. See Steven G Calabresi & Kevin H Rhodes, “The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary” (1992) 105:6 Harv L Rev 1153; Robert J Jr Pushaw, “The Inherent Powers 
of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution” (2001) 86:3 Iowa L Rev 735; Robin 
Elliot, “References, Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s 
Constitution” (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 67.
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not only on the context but also on the disciplinary approach, and some review 
of the terms is merited.
A. CONSIDERING CONTROL
The term “control” is used in disciplines ranging from computing and policing to 
accounting, psychology, and corporate law. A broad, helpful definition of control, 
connecting it to power, comes from both the political and legal literatures. In the 
political context, Robert A Dahl explains the observation and measurement of 
power as: (1) control over resources, (2) control over actors, and (3) control over 
events and outcomes.15 In other words, control is the exercise of power. Similarly, 
at law, control is a term used to denote power and its exercise.16 In the context of 
control in administrative law, Jerry L Mashaw states, “By ‘control’ is meant both 
the formal power to shape agency decision process and the use of that power to 
exclude procedural control by others.”17 In the context of this article, control 
is the ability to have an agency act in a way that suits the executive’s agenda. 
We turn next to examine the concept of accountability.
B. CONSIDERING ACCOUNTABILITY
Accountability is such a broad theme in a range of literatures across law, public 
management, economics, and political science that Oxford has recently published 
edited volumes on the topic. Indeed, the editors of the Oxford Handbook 
of Public Accountability assert, “Accountability is the buzzword of modern 
governance” and the subject of a burgeoning literature.18 The term accountability 
is used in a wide variety of contexts with a range of meanings usually related to 
the purpose for which it is either sought or avoided.19
At a high level of abstraction, Kevin Kearns describes accountability as 
“[an] environment … a constellation of forces—legal, political sociocultural, 
and economic—that place pressure on organizations and the people who work 
15. “The Concept of Power” (1957) 2:3 Systems Research & Behavioral Science 201. See also 
Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Glencoe, III: The Free Press, 1960).
16. See Andrew Halpin, “The Concept of a Legal Power” (1996) 16:1 Oxford J Leg Stud 129.
17. “Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal 
Development” (1990) 6 JL Econ & Org 267 at 288.
18. Mark Bovens, Robert E Goodin & Thomas Schillemans (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014) at 1 [Bovens, Oxford Handbook].
19. See Benedict Cornelius Sheehy, Regulating the University: Examining the Regulatory 
Framework of Australian University Corporations (PhD Thesis, Australian National 
University, 2010) at 88-102 [unpublished], online: <openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/
handle/1885/8954>.
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in them to engage in certain activities and refrain from engaging in others.”20 
In other words, Kearns identifies accountability as the regulation of the activities 
or behaviour of people and organizations. This article focuses on the behaviour 
of the executive branch of government and regulating it by putting legal and 
political pressure on it. As Robert D Behn observes, “For the highest officials… 
we impose accountability through an elaborate constitutional system of checks 
and balances—including periodic elections.”21 Simply put, the ultimate and 
perhaps core accountability institution and mechanism for the executive in 
representative democracies is electoral. Yet, as we argue in this article, the design 
and use of the agency impairs this accountability mechanism by obscuring the 
legal and political connection between the executive and the agency.
Certainly, conceptions and practices of accountability by and for agencies 
have changed over time and vary across jurisdictions in Britain, North America, 
and Australia.22 The work of leading public administration scholars on the 
development and operation of agencies within and across jurisdictions provides 
a realism that may elude legal scholars who engage in higher-level constitutional 
law analysis. Neither realism nor abstraction is unimportant. Rather, when placed 
side by side and synthesized, they provide a much more powerful lens through 
which to understand government, its issues, and its processes.
For purposes of this article, we draw the following definition of 
accountability from the public administration and political science scholars’ 
use of the term23: “accountability” means public accountability of the executive 
branch of government, within the institutions of representative democracies and 
ultimately to the electorate, for its use of power in the administration of the 
public good by way of the agency form. We turn next to consider a technical legal 
definition of the term.
20. Managing for Accountability: Preserving the Public Trust in Public and Nonprofit 
Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996) at 29 [Kearns].
21. Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001) at 6.
22. See G Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks, Changing Regulatory Institutions in Britain and North 
America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). Note the challenges for agency and 
administrative law analysis that the differences create. See also Arthurs, supra note 7 at 2-3.
23. See Bovens, Oxford Handbook, supra note 18 at 5-6.
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C. ACCOUNTABILITY AT LAW
At law, accountability can be defined as “the obligation to explain and justify 
conduct.”24 Thus, accountability is not an arbitrarily imposed obligation to 
explain or justify some decision, act, or phenomenon. Rather, the concept 
of accountability is inherently linked with the concept of obligation. 
An accountability is an obligation. In the agency context, for example, Mark 
Considine states, “[A]ccountability is defined as the legal obligation … that 
agencies obey those in the line of authority above them.”25 The understanding 
of accountability as an obligation or duty is critical for this article as the core 
argument is that the executive is only weakly accountable for the direction of the 
state by shielding itself from accountability through the use of agencies.
Accountability as a fundamental principle of the legal system creates the basic 
constitutional-administrative law issue of executive accountability for agency 
action. The issue with the traditional narrow legal definition, however, is that it 
fails to consider alternative forms and systems of accountability and control that 
link agency action, government, and the electorate—a weakness we argue that 
has been exploited by the executive. Thus, even though the academic discipline 
of law accepts broader conceptions of accountability to include a “family” of 
accountability paths,26 the conservative nature of law as an institution is slower 
to adapt such thinking into practice. We turn next to examine the institutional 
accountability practices of the Westminster and republican systems.
D. EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN WESTMINSTER AND REPUBLICAN 
SYSTEMS
The term “executive accountability” in both Westminster’s responsible 
government and republican systems refers ultimately to some form of democratic 
accountability.27 It ranges from a narrow or strict responsibility to explain or 
justify actions to legislators in some official forum, whether that be Parliament, 
24. Mark Bovens, “Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework” (2007) 
13:4 Eur LJ 447 at 450.
25. “The End of the Line? Accountable Governance in the Age of Networks, Partnerships, and 
Joined-Up Services” (2002) 15:1 Governance 21 at 21.
26. See Mary Liston, “Governments in Miniature: The Rule of Law in the Administrative State” 
in Colleen M Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Edmond 
Montgomery Publications, 2008) 78 at 112.
27. See G Bruce Doern, “Approaches to Managing Interdependence among Regulatory 
Regimes in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States” in G Bruce Doern & 
Stephen Wilks, eds, Changing Regulatory Institutions in Britain and North America (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1998) 263 at 266 [Doern, “Approaches to Managing”].
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Congress, or some committee, or the requirement to explain or justify to an 
interested voting public with a stake in an issue,28 to the electorate generally, 
or to some broadly conceived public good.29
The Westminster30 and republican traditions developed differently and, 
as a consequence, have configured accountability structures and processes 
somewhat differently. Donald J Savoie describes the history of the Westminster 
model as “a story of the struggle for power between the king and Parliament, 
then between Parliament and the executive.”31 He continues, “Some would argue 
that the struggle has recently been extended to ministers and public servants.”32 
The Westminster system itself struggles to control the executive in a majority 
government, which has been described as an “elective dictatorship.”33 Democratic 
accountability in this system relies primarily on the convention of ministerial 
responsibility34, despite the well-known fact that it is impossible for ministers to 
be knowledgeable about the full range of activities of their departments.35 The 
substantive object of this protracted struggle was the sovereign power to rule. 
The outcome ensconced power in an amorphous, unwritten constitution and 
embodied that power in an empowered individual minister, the prime minister 
and in the institution of parliament—particularly as evidenced in the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.36
28. This is the model of regulatory accountability used to power Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
Tripartite model. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 54-60.
29. In Willis’s era, the public interest in US jurisprudence was in such clear focus that he was 
able to write: “the ultimate deciding factor is always what the public interest requires.” Willis, 
supra note 5 at 72.
30. Of course, “Westminster” itself is not a simple or singular concept across the jurisdictions 
where it is found. See e.g. R A W Rhodes, John Wanna & Patrick Weller, Comparing 
Westminster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Rhodes, Comparing Westminster]. The 
use of the term here refers to a Parliament with effectively unified executive and legislative 
branches and the institution of ministerial responsibility.
31. Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada and the United Kingdom 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) at 25.
32. Ibid.
33. David Hamer, Can Responsible Government Survive In Australia?, 2d ed (Canberra, Austl: The 
Department of the Senate, Canberra, 1994) at 344..
34. Savoie, supra note 31 at 32.
35. It was clear even at the time of Dicey’s writing—i.e., mid-19th century—that ministers could 
not answer for all the activities of their departments. See G W Jones, “The Prime Minister’s 
Power” (1964) 18:2 Parliam Aff 167.
36. Adam Tomkins and Geoffrey Marshall discuss the UK system. See ibid at 41-42.
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In the Canadian context, Savoie observes that there was a “widely held view 
in Britain that the United States was too democratic and too republican.”37 The 
consequence was that Canada instituted an unelected Senate. A similar fear of 
“too much democracy” has long been an issue in the United States,38 although 
to a lesser degree, and led to limitations on the proximity of the populace to the 
legislative machinery of government.39 The Australian approach is an interesting 
hybrid modelled on the United States, establishing the three distinct branches of 
government in a Parliamentary democracy.40 Indeed, Sir Owen Dixon, former 
Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, stated, “[I]n most respects [Australia’s] 
constitution makers followed with remarkable fidelity the model of the American 
[Constitution] …. Indeed... roughly speaking, the Australian Constitution is a 
redraft of the American Constitution of 1787 with modifications found suitable 
for the more characteristic British institutions and for Australian conditions.”41
The basic difference between executive accountability in the republican and 
Westminster systems is that whereas the president is not answerable to congress 
(a representative legislative body) for the administration of government, the 
executive is answerable to the Parliament in the Westminster system.42 Rather, 
in the republican system, the president is directly answerable to the electorate 
for the administration of government. The implications of this are significant in 
many respects; however, in terms of implications for executive accountability for 
its use of the agency form in the regulatory state, the systems are very similar.
In terms of both focus and implications, the term “executive accountability” 
differs in responsible government and presidential republican models. In the 
responsible government model, the three branches of government operate more 
collaboratively, relatively speaking, with a small separation of powers. As a result, 
the focus on executive accountability is found in the institution of the opposition 
in parliament and specifically in question period. Ultimate ministerial 
accountability comes through the constitutional law convention of ministerial 
37. Supra note 31 at 36.
38. J Allen Smith, “Recent Institutional Legislation” (1907) 4 P Am Polit Sci Assoc 141 at 141.
39. See e.g. James Madison, “Federalist No 10” in The Federalist Papers (1787). Madison raises 
the concern that direct democracy can be harmful, narrow-minded, and excessively partisan, 
and accordingly, is best put through a representative body.
40. See James A Thomson, “American and Australian Constitutions: Continuing Adventures in 
Comparative Constitutional Law” (1997) 30:3 J Marshall L Rev 627 at 640.
41. Ibid at 628, citing Owen Dixon, “Two Constitutions Compared” in Own Dixon, Jesting 
Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (Melbourne: Law Book, 1965) at 734.
42. This continuous accountability is considered to be one of the causes of the inability of 
Westminster Parliaments’ to effectively control their executives. See Hamer, supra note 
33 at xvii-xviii.
SHEEHY, FEAVER,  ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE AGENCY 187
resignation—an executive accountability institution undermined by the party 
system43 and generally of contested value and currency.44 In the contest set up 
by the separation of powers of the presidential republican model, executive 
accountability is a function of the focus of the other two branches of government 
on keeping the executive in check.45
Both of these models were structured and designed to provide institutional 
accountability of the executive branch of government and are significantly 
challenged in the regulatory state. Work by Savoie examining the empowered 
prime minister in the responsible government model46 and by Eskridge on the 
republican model,47 identify and analyze the exacerbation of accountability issues 
resulting from the executives’ increased use of the agency in the regulatory state. 
These authors argue that one consequence of the growing trend to conduct 
government business through agencies is a greatly empowered executive that is less 
accountable via traditional accountability institutions for its acts and decisions.
It is important not to overemphasize democratic accountability for executive 
action. As Michael Dowdle observes, “in the Anglo-American world, intellectual 
and political support for electoral democracy has always been decidedly mixed.”48 
In other words, democratic accountability has been only a limited feature of the 
systems and has been mediated in different ways. Direct democracy has been 
deemed undesirable while the institution of representative democracy has become 
the chosen path. As a result, not only has accountability of the executive for its 
actions been allocated to different institutions institutionally, but, in more recent 
times, as the need for administration has overwhelmed earlier administrative 
structures, the regulatory state has shifted to focus on new institutions that 
43. See Rhodes, Comparing Westminster, supra note 30 at 122.
44. See Diana Woodhouse, “Ministerial Responsibility in the 1990s: When do Ministers 
Resign?” (1993) 46:3 Parliam Aff 277. For a nuanced, cross-jurisdictional examination, 
see Elaine Thompson & Greg Tillotsen, “Caught in the Act: The Smoking Gun View of 
Ministerial Responsibility” (1999) 58:1 Aust J Pub Admin 48.
45. See Walter Dellinger, “Appendix: The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the 
President and Congress” (2000) 63:1 L & Contemp Problems 513.
46. Supra note 31 at 31.
47. See William N Eskridge, Jr & John Ferejohn, “Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the 
Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State” (1992) 8:1 
JL Econ & Org 166 at 166-67.
48. Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at 4.
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expand opportunities for accountability. This shift includes new thinking about 
independent accountability agencies,49 markets,50 and even new technologies.51
Recognizing the challenges of holding the executive in both systems to 
account, different solutions arose. In the United States, mid-nineteenth century 
reformers put hope in a professionalized bureaucracy. In the United Kingdom, 
that same era saw a resort to the courts as a preferred solution—a position only 
adopted in the United States in the 1930s.52 In the present era of the regulatory 
state, however, the ability to hold the executive to account for the agency is a matter 
of increasing concern. For example, a study of twenty parliaments across the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand describes the situation as 
follows, “[C]ontrol of delegated legislation…is virtually non-existent in many of 
the twenty parliaments and inadequate in all of them. Parliamentary supervision 
of government business enterprises and other non-departmental government 
activities is derisory.”53 Similar concern has been expressed in the United States, 
spawning a whole literature in law,54 economics,55 and political science.56
At law, close connections exist between the terms accountability and 
obligation, and between power and control. In the context of the governance 
49. See John Ackerman, “Understanding Independent Accountability Agencies” in Susan 
Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth, eds, Comparative Administrative Law (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 2010) 265.
50. See Johnston Birchall, Christopher Pollitt & Keith Putnam, Decentralising Public Service 
Management (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1998); B Guy Peters & Donald J Savoie, 
Governance in a Changing Environment (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995); 
Benedict Sheehy, “Regulation by Markets and the Bradley Review of Australian Higher 
Education” (2010) 52:1 Austl U Rev 60.
51. See Roger Brownsword, “Code, Control, and Choice: Why East is East and West is West” 
(2005) 25:1 J Legal Stud 1.
52. See Dowdle, supra note 48.
53. Hamer, supra note 33 at xvii.
54. See Abner S Greene, “Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking” (1994) 
61:1 U Chicago L Rev 123; Neal Kumar Katyal, “Internal Separation of Powers: Checking 
Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within” (2006) 115:9 Yale LJ 123; Gillian E Metzger, 
“The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers” 
(2009) 59:2 Emory LJ 423.
55. The American Economic Association has a whole classification code dedicated to the issue; 
code D73 is used to classify scholarly literature in the field of economics that focuses on 
“administrative processes in public organizations.” See American Economic Association, 
“JEL Classification System,” online: <www.aeaweb.org/econlit/jelCodes.php?view=jel>. See 
also Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in 
Political Science (New York: Routledge, 1991).
56. See B Dan Wood & Richard W Waterman, “The Dynamics of Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy” (1991) 85:3 Am Pol Sci Rev 801.
SHEEHY, FEAVER,  ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE AGENCY 189
and legal literatures, control and accountability are frequently used together. For 
example, it is common to read of “the control and accountability of public body 
x.”57 This phrasing raises the question of whether the terms are being used as 
synonyms or as representing distinct but interrelated concepts.58 One tradition 
sees the two as largely unrelated, considering control as ex ante decision-making 
influence whereas accountability is ex post oversight.59 In this view, one can have 
accountability without control and vice-versa. A second tradition sees them as 
related concepts on a continuum. This tradition acknowledges that accountability 
is itself a type of control. In Colin Scott’s words, it treats “control and accountability 
as linked concepts, operating on a continuum where managerial control refers to 
the right to ex ante involvement in decision-making, while accountability-based 
control refers to ex post oversight.” 60
Kearns’ definition of accountability as “an environment… a constellation 
of forces”61 is too broad for the purposes of this article. Accordingly, we will 
use the narrower legal and political meanings (i.e., “the obligation to explain 
and justify conduct” 62 in the contexts of the formal governance institutions). 
In these narrower political and legal traditions, the two concepts are treated as 
types or classes of norms, rules, and practices that either grant a right or impose 
an obligation on institutions of government and upon the public officials who 
work within them. These rights and obligations can be mapped both as specific 
legal rules and as political practices that, combined, operate as mixed formal and 
informal rule systems. In turn, these rule systems form the broad control and 
accountability systems that create the foundations of the distinct structures of 
both classical models of government. It is our argument that these accountability 
57. Leslie Eldenburg & Ranjani Krishnan, “Management Accounting and Control in Health 
Care: An Economics Perspective” in Christopher S Chapman, Anthony G Hopwood & 
Michael D Shields, eds, Handbook of Management Accounting, vol 2 (Oxford: Elsevier, 2007).
58. See Colin Scott, “Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 27:1 JL & Soc’y 38.
59. Ibid at 40.
60. Ibid at 39. See also Richard Mulgan, “Accountability Issues in the New Model of 
Governance” (Australian National University Working Paper No 91, 2002) online: 
<openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/41701>. Mulgan states:
‘[A]ccountability’ is not the same as ‘regulation’ or ‘control’, which are essentially 
forward-looking mechanisms of influencing behaviour, whereas accountability is retrospective, 
inquiring into actions that have already taken place. Systems of control and regulation often 
include accountability mechanisms, as when people are held accountable for breaking the 
law or for acting unprofessionally. But they are not identical to these mechanisms (ibid at 3).
61. Kearns, supra note 20 at 65.
62. Bovens, Oxford Handbook, supra note 18 at 294.
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and control systems have been separated over time, though they have been 
designed to function best together.
It is critical to the analysis to distinguish between two different types of 
control and accountability relationships. The first are the legal controls and 
legal accountabilities. These are set out in the positive law of the constitution. 
Legal control and legal accountability occur in the context of control powers 
or accountability obligations enshrined in law. In other words, control and 
accountability are considered legal when they can be enforced through the 
courts.63 The second are the political accountability and political control 
of conventions and practices. This second type exists only in, and through, 
institutions and political networks. As will be demonstrated, legal and political 
are not commensurate and as between the two, political control and political 
accountability are less symmetrical than the legal.
Political control arises where a political actor has power to influence decisions 
of public bodies. Political accountability occurs through government organs, 
such as parliament or congress, with their related structures and processes, and 
ultimately by way of election. Legal control and legal accountability and related 
political control and political accountability were established in a historical context 
markedly different from the present. We turn next to consider that context.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN CLASSICAL CONSTITUTIONS
The two classical models of governments, the responsible government and 
presidential republican models, find their roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. As noted, they provided roughly balanced levels of control and 
accountability but importantly, were reflective of their times.64 A small number 
of ministers and officers wielded control power, limited in scope, over small 
populations and had specific, personal obligations to answer or account. Their 
power and obligation were appropriate for the relatively small administrative 
machinery under the control of government (the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches). For example, the first Presidential Cabinet of the United 
63. Although in respect of legal accountability and control, the legally correct and more precise 
terms are “rights” and “duties,” these terms are not used in this article. This decision was 
taken because in the context of constitutional law both legal and political discourses use the 
terms “powers” and “obligations,” as opposed to the Hohfeldian terminology of “claims” 
(rights) and “duties”.
64. See Willis, supra note 5 at 72.
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States appointed by President George Washington was composed only of a 
Secretary of State, a Secretary of the Treasury, a Secretary of War, and an Attorney 
General—a size suited to administering the limited needs of a nation with less 
than one million voters.65 The Cabinet of the English government, by contrast, 
while originally providing advice to the sovereign monarch as the Privy Council, 
was reconstituted under the responsible government model to include elected 
officials. The cabinet of George III (1760–1820), 66 for example, had nine 
members known as the Great Officers of State,67 and eight further members.68 
These officers obtained their positions by a combination of appointment by royal 
prerogative, inheritance, and election.69 Further, it is to be kept in mind that 
those exercising power were for the most part sitting in Parliament and governing 
about 2 million voters.70
A. THE AGENCY AND THE RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Although agencies (particularly adjudicative tribunals) have existed in Britain 
for centuries,71 the modern agency came into its own in the United States in the 
65. The first census, conducted in 1790, registered 3,929,214 people. US, US Census Bureau, 
Measuring America: The Decennial Censuses from 1790 to 2000 (September 2002) at Appendix 
A, online: <www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/pol02marv.pdf>. Given that suffrage was only 
granted to white male landowners, and that families seldom had less than three children, 
a back of the envelope calculation leads to the suggestion that the voting population was less 
than one million.
66. See John Cannon, “George III” (2004), online: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
<dx.doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/10540>.
67. Lord High Steward, Lord High Chancellor, Lord High Treasurer, Lord President of the 
Council, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Great Chamberlain, Lord High Constable, Earl Marshal, 
and Lord High Admiral. See D A Winstanley, “George III and His First Cabinet” (1902) 
17:68 Engl Hist Rev 678 at 679 [Winstanley]. See also JH Plumb, “The Organization of 
the Cabinet in the Reign of Queen Anne” in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth 
Series, Volume 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 137. For discussion of the 
formation of the Cabinet in the UK, see John P Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1977) at 35-74.
68. Winstanley, ibid at 680.
69. Ibid.
70. The first census, conducted in 1801, registered 10,942,646 people but the census was far 
from complete. See UK, HC, “Abstracts of the Answers and Returns: Enumeration, Part I 
England and Wales”, Cmnd 140 (1801), online: A Vision of Britain Through Time <www.
visionofbritain.org.uk/census/SRC_P/1/GB1801ABS_1>; Richard Wall, Matthew Woollard 
& Beatrice Moring, Census Schedules and Listings, 1801-1831: An Introduction and Guide 
(Colchester, UK: University of Essex, Dept of History, 2004).
71. See Chantal Stebbings, Legal Foundations of Tribunals in Nineteenth-Century England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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twentieth century. The agency in this context refers to a specialized body and 
organizational form granted a distinct set of legal powers to execute its mandate 
and allocated a specific set of rule-making, adjudicative, and administrative 
tasks.72 To use a conceptually helpful, if outdated,73 Canadian phrase, agencies 
can be described as “governments in miniature.”74
The difference between the agencies in the United Kingdom and the agencies 
in the American model is significant. In the United Kingdom, agencies—with 
adjudicative tasks, among other things—have existed for a long time as a part of 
the legal and administrative apparatus of government. They have been accepted 
by judiciary, legislature, and executive alike.75 In contrast, in the United States, 
with its strong separation of powers, the agency took on distinct and contested 
powers and required high levels of support from various interested parties to 
survive and achieve its mission.76
In addition, whereas the UK scholarship has long focused on the variety 
of functions and forms of agencies77—a matter that readily distracts from 
the executive accountability and constitutional issues—the US discussion 
has focused on the supposed autonomy and contested control of the agency, 
including the problem of purported rogue agencies. Again, these focal points 
distract from the more foundational issues of linking the agency to the three 
branches of government, and particularly executive accountability for agency 
72. See Feaver & Sheehy, “The Political Division of Regulatory Labour,” supra note 1. 
A definition coincident with Harold M Bowman, “American Administrative Tribunals” 
(1906) 21:4 Polit Sci Q 609.
73. See Richard Schultz & G Bruce Doern, “No Longer ‘Governments in Miniature’: 
Canadian Sectoral Regulatory Institutions” in G Bruce Doern & Stephen Wilks, eds, 
Changing Regulatory Institutions in Britain and North America (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998).
74. Term coined in Willis, supra note 5 at 73. The term is still used in Canadian administrative 
law. See Liston, supra note 26.
75. See discussion in William A Robson, Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British 
Constitution, 3d ed (London: Stevens and Sons, 1951) at 17-27.
76. See Thomas K McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, 
James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984) at 
63. For a broader argument, see Daniel Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: 
Networks, Reputations, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001).
77. Hood’s popular “zoo” description of the variety is an apt example. See Christopher Hood, 
“The Hidden Public Sector: The ‘Quangocratization’ of the World?” in Franz-Xaver 
Kaufmann et al, eds, Guidance, Control and Evaluation in the Public Sector (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1986) 165. William A Robson provides an earlier analysis and discussion of variety. 
See Robson, supra note 75 at 89-316.
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conduct. Agencies can be connected to any of the three branches of government, 
but are, for the most part, bodies of the executive branch. Their mandates can 
include a host of activities from rulemaking and adjudication to delivery of basic 
public services.
As an organizational form, the agency was developed as a solution to the 
problems arising from a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine78 
and its responsible government equivalent, rule of law.79 A strict application of 
the doctrine creates legal, political, and administrative problems because complex 
social problems require a coordinated, simultaneous contribution from all three 
branches of government. In practical terms, the separation hinders the efficient and 
timely delivery of public services because the necessary rule-making, adjudicative, 
and administrative functions and powers are restricted to the separate branches 
of government. The related departments of these branches all have their own 
policies, rules, and procedures. This arrangement causes significant delays when 
trying to solve problems that require contributions from all three branches. This 
structural isolation, which addresses the political concern of avoiding tyranny, 
fails to address the more mundane problem of effective and efficient conduct of 
the administration of government. That such coordination problems should arise 
illustrates both the effectiveness of the design in terms of limiting opportunities 
for tyranny as well as the costs inherent in that design.
A good example of the problem that the separation of powers creates can 
be seen in the United States. In the 1880s, after the court struck down state 
legislation in Wabash, St Louis and Pacific Railway v Illinois, regulation of 
railway freight tariffs at the federal level became the only option and presented 
the Federal Government with a difficult problem.80 As was recognized in the 
United Kingdom with the passage of the Regulation of Railway Act of 1873,81 the 
setting of freight rates required a flexible rule-making procedure that allowed for 
frequent changes of a sort that was wholly unsuited to the rule-making procedures 
of traditional institutions of government, such as Congress, whose procedures 
were more suited to less dynamic contexts with considerably less urgency. The 
freight tariff rule-making process was done on an ongoing basis in a manner 
resembling an adjudicative process. As part of this process, parties affected by the 
78. See David H Rosenbloom, “Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers” 
(1983) 43:3 Pub Admin Rev 219.
79. Willis, supra note 5 at 70.
80. See George W Hilton, “The Consistency of the Interstate Commerce Act” (1966) 
9 JL & Econ 87.
81. 118 US 557, 7 S Ct 4. See also Marshall E Dimock, British Public Utilities and National 
Development (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933) at 70.
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rules presented their positions on rate adjustments to a court-like body which, 
after hearing the submissions, would decide an appropriate freight rate. The final 
step, implementing the rates, required monitoring and, if need be, enforcement.
Given that the separation of powers doctrine required each of these functions 
to be executed by a separate branch of government, the classical model’s structure 
created an unworkable procedure for which there was no constitutional solution. 
Accordingly, the only solution was to create a new alternative—a new body 
that was empowered to conduct all three constitutionally separated governance 
functions. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), modelled on the UK’s 
Railway and Canal Commission,82 was created as a permanent body empowered 
to administer a complex regulatory scheme that included ongoing rule-making 
and adjudicative functions in the setting of freight rates. The ICC was also tasked 
with monitoring and enforcement functions and powers.83
Clearly, the classical models of government, with their strict separation 
of powers, are poorly suited to complex governance problems that require a 
coordinated amalgam of rule-making, adjudicative, and executive functions. 
Over time it became clear that a single organization, an “agency” designed to 
deal with the many and increasing complex economic and social problems, was 
a more effective and efficient organizational form than the separate branches 
of government.84 The agency readily allows such coordination problems to be 
solved. The agency has been described as a “one stop shop”, empowered with 
varying combinations of rule-making, administrative decision-making, and 
82. See I L Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, vol 1 (New York: The Commonwealth 
Fund, 1931) at 16.
83. See Thomas Gilligan, William J Marshall & Barry R Weingast, “Regulation and the Theory 
of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887” (1989) 32:1 JL & Econ 35.
84. The need for a more flexible form of governance arrangement emerged as a consequence 
of increasing social and political complexity through the nineteenth century. Increasing 
population growth, rapid economic development as a result of industrialization, and social 
issues arising from a shifting demographic required government take a more interventionist 
role in society. This resulted in intensification of the policy-making and steering functions. 
In Britain, the changing function and role of government was prompted by the passage of 
the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 which expanded the franchise and contributed to the rise 
of the party system. See Representation of the People Act, 1832 (UK) 2 & 3 Wm IV, c 45. See 
also Representation of the People Act, 1867 (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 102. In the United States, 
political and social change following the Civil War resulted in the consolidation of federal 
power, and immigration and Western territorial expansion fueled demand for the provision 
of public services as well as the need to regulate an increasingly complex economy.
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adjudicative functions and powers.85 The concern, of course, is that combining 
these functions and powers within a single body results in what Rosenbloom 
describes as “a nullification of the constitutional separation of power doctrine, 
as all the powers are collapsed within a single organizational structure.”86 This 
combination raises the spectre of tyranny.
The innovative solution of the ICC was important not only because it 
became the prototypical federal agency87 and served as a model for similar bodies 
elsewhere,88 but also because of the way it actively combined all three of the 
sovereign governance functions and powers. With that being said, the creation of 
the ICC was not an easily won solution. Rather, it followed a protracted political 
battle between the President and Congress over control of the regulation of 
railroad companies89 and went through a series of significant law reforms from its 
inception in 1887 until 1940.90
More widespread use of agencies based on the model of the ICC did not 
occur until after the onset of the Great Depression and the creation of the New 
Deal agencies, of which the Tennessee Valley Authority was the exemplar. The 
creation of the New Deal agencies is said to have confirmed the establishment of 
the “administrative state.”91 The administrative state is defined by Edward Rubin 
as the structural change in government “from a system of rules elaborated and 
implemented by the judiciary to a system of comprehensive regulation elaborated 
and implemented by administrative agencies.”92 In addition to being separate 
from the judiciary, the agency was also to be independent of the executive. This 
independence or autonomy, however, is more mythical than real.93 The myth 
of agency autonomy—i.e., freedom from executive control—can be traced back 
to Chief Justice Sutherland’s judgment in the United States Supreme Court 
85. Frank Bannister, “E-Government and Administrative Power: The One-Stop-Shop Meets 
the Turf War” (2005) 2:2 Electronic Government 160, online: <dx.doi.org/10.1504/
EG.2005.007092>.
86. Supra note 78.
87. See McCraw, supra note 76 at 62.
88. For example, section 101 of the Australian Constitution establishes an Inter-state 
Commission based on the ICC. See An Act to Constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, 1900 
(UK) 63 & 64 Vic c 12, s 101.
89. See Hilton, supra note 80.
90. See McCraw, supra note 76 at 62-63.
91. See Feaver & Sheehy, “The Political Division of Regulatory Labour”, supra note 1 at 31.
92. “It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative” (2003) 89:1 Cornell 
L Rev 95 at 96.
93. See McCraw, supra note 76 at 62-63.
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case Humphrey’s Executor v United States.94 In that case, he stated that an agency 
“is an administrative body created by Congress to carry into effect legislative 
policies embodied in the statute. ... Such a body cannot in any proper sense be 
characterized as an arm or eye of the executive. Its duties are performed without 
executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free from 
executive control.”95
In commenting on the implications of Sutherland’s assertion, Geoffrey P 
Miller summarizes how the notion of an agency that is neither legislature nor 
court, yet is independent of the executive branch, is exceedingly difficult to 
reconcile with a tripartite structure of government. Even fervent admirers of 
independent agencies have recognized this fact, conceding that they were created 
“[w]ithout too much political theory.”96
In other words, the agency, while solving administrative problems, creates its 
own new problems in terms of constitutional law and the institutional structure 
of government, and consequently government accountability for the agency, 
as well as agency accountability to government. Specifically, it clearly falls afoul 
of the theories and doctrines of constitutional law and particularly the separation 
of powers doctrine. It also challenges democratic theory and practice with respect 
to accountability and control.
B. THE AGENCY AND THE RISE OF THE REGULATORY STATE
The rise of the regulatory state, like the administrative state, relies on the agency. 
The difference between the two is that whereas the administrative state used 
the agency sparingly (relatively speaking), and often as a public service delivery 
organization addressing complex governance problems, the regulatory state uses 
the agency as the primary method for creating and administering a comprehensive 
regulatory infrastructure. These regulatory agencies perform nearly every aspect 
of governance. They range from advisory and policy bodies, rule makers, 
and quasi-judicial decision-making bodies to operational bodies overseeing 
the provision of public goods such as health care and urban transportation 
systems. These organizations are charged with everything from rule creation, 
administration, and monitoring through to adjudication and enforcement.
The sections that follow examine the complications that arise from the 
interposition of the agency in terms of executive control and accountability, 
in both republican presidential and responsible government models. We will 
94. (1935) 295 US 602, 55 S Ct 869 [Humphrey’s Executor].
95. Ibid at 628.
96. Geoffrey P Miller, “Independent Agencies” (1986) 1986:1 Sup Ct Rev 41 at 43.
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demonstrate how grafting the agency onto the classical models interferes with 
executive accountability for the administration of government, despite the 
executive’s continuing and increasing control over the administrative machinery 
of government situated in agencies in the regulatory state. In particular, we make 
clear the basic constitutional problem, namely that the agency emerged after 
the institutionalization of government structures within constitutions, and so 
is not explicitly addressed in the classical constitutional frameworks, it has been 
necessary to create new structures and procedures to control it.97 These include 
such bodies as independent accountability agencies.98 As the phrase “agencies 
are creatures of statute” indicates, agencies are post-constitutional organizations 
whose relationship to the constitutionally identified branches of government has 
been determined post facto and largely on an ad hoc basis.
What will become evident in the discussion is that the process of integrating 
the agency into the constitutional framework was commenced by the judiciary and 
subsequently reinforced by statutory developments.99 Although a foundational 
principle in classical constitutional design was to balance accountability and 
control within government, neither the judiciary nor the legislature attended to 
that foundation in determining the legal and political accountability and control 
relationships between the executive, the agencies, and the rest of government. 
Indeed, both courts and legislatures have treated control and accountability 
as separate and independent concepts rather than as complementary power 
relationships that need to be balanced within the institutional and organizational 
frameworks of government. As a result, the regulatory state’s agencified 
model tends to lead to an unacceptable degree of severance of the control and 
accountability relationship. In what follows, we present an explanation of the 
changes to the structure and institutions of government, showing how the 
executive has come to exercise considerable control powers over the agency 
while attenuating its corresponding accountability obligations for the exercise 
of those control powers. We turn now to examine this proposition in the two 
constitutional models—first, the presidential republican and then the responsible 
government model of the Westminster system.
97. See Peter L Strauss, “The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the 
Fourth Branch” (1984) 84:3 Colum L Rev 573; Steven P Croley, “Theories of Regulation: 
Incorporating the Administrative Process” (1998) 98:1 Colum L Rev 1.
98. See Ackerman, “Understanding Independent” supra note 49.
99. See Bernard Schwartz, “Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegations and 
Judicial Review” (1981) 1982:2 Wis L Rev 208; Feaver & Sheehy, “The Shifting 
Balance,” supra note 2.
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III. AGENCY CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
REPUBLICAN MODEL
This section of the article explores the relationship of the executive branch to 
the so-called independent agencies in the republican model. The discussion 
begins with the historical premise that the agency is largely independent of the 
executive branch as per Justice Tuft’s decision in Myers v United States (discussed 
in greater detail below).100  Yet, since this initial era when the foundations of the 
administrative state were laid, the legal and political relationship between the 
president and the agency has undergone significant change.101 Gradually, over the 
intervening years, the executive acquired a considerable degree of legal and political 
influence over the agency and its activities without, however, a corresponding 
increase in accountability. The executive’s increase in control has come about as a 
result of a series of Supreme Court decisions, combined with other forms of direct 
and indirect presidential intervention. The executive’s acquisition of greater legal 
control of the agency has consequently also allowed it to acquire greater political 
control of the machinery of government.102 Indeed, we will demonstrate that 
executive accountability for the agency is virtually non-existent.103
A. EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF AGENCIES IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The starting point for this analysis is the United States Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the executive-agency relationship in the era of the administrative 
state. In that era, the USSC struggled with the constitutional complexities 
of respecting Congress’s desire to insulate the independent agencies from the 
influence of the executive branch without trampling the separation of powers 
doctrine.104 The first test of this balancing act, Myers v United States, was decided 
in 1926.105 At first glance, Myers appears to be a setback for Congress. However, 
the decision set the stage for the decision in Humphrey’s Executor, which is said 
100. (1926) 272 US 52, 47 S Ct 21 [Myers].
101. See Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration” (2001) 114:8 Harv L Rev 2245.
102. See Peter Swire, “Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the Executive Branch” (1985) 
94:7 Yale LJ 1766.
103. See Robert E Cushman, “Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory 
Commissions” (1939) 24:1 Cornell LQ 13; Harold H Bruff, “On the Constitutional Status 
of the Administrative Agencies” (1986-1987) 36:2 Am U L Rev 491; Frederick R Anderson, 
“Revisiting the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies” (1986-1987) 36:2 
Am U L Rev 277.
104. See Swire, supra note 102 at 1768.
105. Supra note 100.
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to be the “high-water mark” of agency independence from executive control 
based upon a “division of governance labour” implementing the separation of 
powers doctrine.
Early in the administrative state era, Congress endeavoured to insulate the 
independent agencies from executive influence by constituting agencies in a manner 
that sought to dilute the president’s appointment power, challenge the president’s 
implied removal power, and impose the legislative veto. The Appointments Clause 
is an important source of the president’s powers to control the administration. 
It provides that the president may appoint all “officers of the United States”—in 
certain cases requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.106 It has long been 
acknowledged that presidents use this power to appoint heads of departments 
and other senior personnel who share their political agenda.107 Congress sought 
to dilute this power by designing the independent agencies with a governance 
structure that relied on multimember boards. Agencies such as the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) are all governed by 
multimember boards. Additionally, Congress included the requirement that their 
officials be appointed for fixed terms that do not correspond to presidential terms 
of office, making it difficult for a president to appoint an entire board.
In addition to diluting the effects of the president’s power to appoint, 
Congress also endeavoured to insulate the independent agencies by setting 
the terms under which appointees can be removed from office. Whereas the 
Constitution explicitly grants the president the power to appoint, it does not 
grant the president any explicit removal power.108 Until the decision of Myers v 
United States in 1926, the Supreme Court had not made any rulings regarding 
the source and extent of the removal power.109 Despite declaring the agency 
separate from the executive, Chief Justice Taft also held that:
Article II grants to the President the executive power of the Government, i.e., 
the general Administrative control of those executing the laws, [and]… that the 
President’s power of removal is … an incident to his specifically enumerated function 
of appointment by and with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does 
106. Swire, supra note 102 at 1776.
107. See Patricia Ingraham, “Building Bridges or Burning Them?: The President, the Appointees, 
and the Bureaucracy” (1987) 47:5 Pub Admin Rev 425.
108. US Const art III, s 2, cl 2.
109. See Myers, supra note 100. The provision, as stated in Myers is: “Postmasters of the first, 
second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold their offices for four years unless 
sooner removed or suspended according to law.” Ibid at 241.
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not by implication extend to removals … and finally that to hold otherwise would 
make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other differences with the 
Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.110
Accordingly, the USSC decided that the removal order made by the president 
was a valid exercise of his plenary powers and that the statutory provision limiting 
his power to remove was therefore void. In determining that executive power 
includes an implied power to remove superior officers from office, the Supreme 
Court identified a legal control power that simultaneously held significant 
political implications.111
Thus the Myers decision established a significant legal link between the 
president and agencies, a link that was examined more closely in Humphrey’s 
Executor v United States. The facts of that case are well known. President Roosevelt 
fired William Humphrey, a Federal Trade Commissioner, because Roosevelt 
believed Humphrey did not support the New Deal—a clearly politically motivated 
act. Roosevelt’s decision was challenged pursuant to a statutory provision that 
permitted the president to dismiss only in the event of “inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance in office.”112 The United States Supreme Court drew upon a 
concept previously raised in Myers— “the character of the office”—and developed 
it further as a means of limiting the broader Myers holding and hence, limiting 
the scope of the legal control link between the executive and agency.113
The “character of the office” concept was central to the decision in Humphrey’s 
Executor. The USSC noted that the Post Office, the agency in question in 
Myers, performed functions that were executive and administrative in nature. 
By contrast, the USSC characterized the “distinctive character” of the Federal 
Trade Commission as being more “quasi-legislative” than administrative.114 
By analyzing whether the powers and functions exercised by an agency are 
predominantly quasi-legislative or judicial (as opposed to executive, as they were 
in Myers), the USSC identified a justification for limiting the president’s removal 
power to those agencies whose functions are primarily administrative in nature. 
The USSC decided that the duties of the Federal Trade Commission were “neither 
political nor executive” and that its rule-making function required special expertise 
and impartiality.115 Hence, the circumstances necessitated some insulation from 
110. Ibid at 117.
111. The implication being that a senior appointment is not likely to act in a manner contrary to 
the president’s wishes for fear of being removed.
112. Humphrey’s Executor, supra note 94 at 622.
113. Ibid at 632
114. Ibid at 624.
115. Ibid.
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presidential influence and the removal was found to be invalid.116 The effect of 
Humphrey’s Executor was that presidential control was limited to a tenuous link 
via the exercise of the removal power that could only be applied in respect of a 
certain type of agency—one exercising only executive functions. Significantly, 
the decision was handed down at a time when the majority of agencies possessed 
rule-making and adjudicative powers. This subtle distinction between executive 
and legislative agencies provides the foundation for the rise of the “executive” 
agency and the decline of the independent agency as a governance mechanism.
B. EXECUTIVE CONTROL IN THE REGULATORY STATE
Since the era of Humphrey’s Executor and contemporaneously with the change from 
the administrative state to the regulatory state, a gradual and significant erosion 
of congressional control power occurred. In the administrative state era, Congress 
endeavoured to insulate the independent agencies from executive influence by 
diluting the president’s appointment power, sidestepping the president’s implied 
removal power, and frequently imposing a legislative veto. In the rising regulatory 
state era, however, the judiciary invalidated all three mechanisms, effectively 
shifting legal and political control of the independent agencies from Congress to 
the executive branch.
Three United States Supreme Court cases chart the course of this shift. The 
first, Buckley v Valeo, was decided in 1976.117 In it, the Supreme Court held 
that a legislative scheme granting Congress control over the appointment of 
officers to the Federal Electoral Commission was unconstitutional. Similarly, 
in a case handed down in 1986, Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United 
States v Synar, Member of Congress, et al, the Supreme Court further rejected a 
legislative scheme used by Congress to control the removal of senior officers—a 
scheme that had gone unchallenged for more than sixty years.118 In Bowsher, 
a case involving the removal of the comptroller general pursuant to statutory 
provisions that restricted the presidential removal power, the USSC noted that 
the statute’s “removal powers over the Comptroller General’s office dictate that 
he will be subservient to Congress.”119 The USSC remarked that by “placing 
116. See Swire, supra note 102.
117. 424 US 1, 96 S Ct 612.
118. 478 US 714, 106 S Ct 3181.
119. Because the Act contained contingency procedures for implementing the budget reductions 
in the event that the primary mechanism was invalidated, the USSC rejected the suggestion 
that it should invalidate the l921 removal provision rather than the Deficit Act’s conferral 
of executive power in the Comptroller General. To do so would frustrate congressional 
intention and significantly alter the Comptroller General’s office. Ibid at 729-30, 734-36.
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the responsibility for execution of the… Act in the hands of an officer who is 
subject to removal only by… Congress, [Congress] in effect has retained control 
over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function.”120 
The USSC also noted that the comptroller general was performing functions 
that were primarily executive in nature (although he also had some rule-making 
powers). Accordingly, consistent with the nature of the office line of reasoning, 
the legislative scheme was struck down as void.
The USSC also struck down the third and final means by which Congress 
sought to maintain control over agencies—the “legislative veto.” The legislative 
veto was developed as a means of controlling delegations of rule-making powers 
to agencies and first appeared in the Legislative Appropriations Act in 1932.121 
After appearing in over two hundred pieces of legislation, the single-house veto 
(congressional veto) mechanism was challenged in Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v Chadha et al.122 Although the facts in Chadha did not involve an agency, 
the Supreme Court held that the one-house legislative veto of actions taken by 
public officials involved in “executing the law” is a restraint on the executive power 
to administer legislation.123 Consequently, the legislative veto was found to be 
unconstitutional. The effect of this decision, as with the ones that went before, was 
a complete erosion of the power of Congress to control the independent agencies. 
The net result is an increasingly powerful executive vis-à-vis a less autonomous 
agency and an increasingly powerless Congress. The United States Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) investigation into the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA)’s Detention and Interrogation Program illustrates the problem 
well. Congress sought to investigate the agency’s use of torture. The agency lied to 
members of Congress, hacked into the SSCI’s computers, and made every effort 
120. Ibid at 734-36.
121. See Jonathan B Fellows, “Congressional Oversight Through Legislative Veto After INS v 
Chadha” (1984) 69:6 Cornell L Rev 1244 at 1244.
122. (1983), 462 US 919, 03 S Ct 2764.
123. Ibid.
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to obstruct oversight.124 The SSCI was ultimately able to compile and prepare 
for release a six thousand page report. By way of response, President Obama, 
while publicly condemning the actions of the CIA and praising exposure of its 
wrongs, sought to minimize the details of the report to the electorate by way of 
extensive redaction.125 The agency’s actions, with the acquiescence or connivance 
of the executive, are one of the starkest examples of the shifting accountability 
and control between Congress and the executive.
C. POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE REGULATORY STATE
The judiciary’s erosion of congressional control through the limitation of 
congressional removal powers and legislative veto coincides with the ascendency 
of other measures by the executive to exercise control over agencies. Beginning in 
1980, Ronald Reagan used “his appointment power, perhaps more successfully 
than any modern President, to staff the agencies with officials remarkable for 
their personal loyalty and ideological commitment, who would subscribe to his 
(obligingly clear) policy agenda in the face of competing bureaucratic pressures.”126
These appointments laid the foundation for Reagan’s Executive Order 
12,291, requiring executive (but not independent) agencies to submit major 
rule changes to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) 
(a specialist branch of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)), along 
with both a regulatory impact analysis and a cost-benefit analysis. According 
to Kagan, although Executive Order 12,291 “explicitly disclaimed any right on 
the part of the OMB, or of the President himself, to dictate or displace agency 
decisions, the order effectively gave OMB a form of substantive control over 
124. The details of the battle between the SSCI and the CIA are the subject of much journalistic 
investigation, including The Guardian’s three part inside story. See Spencer Ackerman, 
“Inside the fight to expose the CIA’s torture secrets,” The Guardian (9 September 
2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/09/cia-insider-daniel-jones-
senate-torture-investigation>. A similar scenario played out in the 1970s with the 
Church Committee’s congressional investigation into CIA activities and the executive’s 
efforts to avoid scrutiny. See John Prados & Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, eds, “White 
House Efforts to Blunt 1975 Church Committee Investigation into CIA Abuses 
Foreshadowed Executive-Congressional Battles after 9/11”, National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book No 522 (20 July 2015), online: <nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB522-Church-Committee-Faced-White-House-Attempts-to-Curb-CIA-Probe/>.
125. See Connie Bruck, “The Inside War: To Expose Torture, Dianne Feinstein Fought the 
CIA—and the White House,” New Yorker (22 June 2015), online: <www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2015/06/22/the-inside-war>.
126. Kagan, supra note 101 at 2277.
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rule-making…”.127 This Executive Order penetrated deeply into the independent 
agencies and put them under the scrutiny of the executive as never before.128
Executive Order 12,291 was replaced by Executive Order 12,866 of the 
Clinton Administration in 1993. Executive Order 12,866 was aimed  at all 
“significant regulatory action… likely to result in a rule” that:
(1)  would have an annual effect on the economy of one-hundred million dollars or 
more, or adversely affect the economy or a sector of the economy, productivity, 
competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or state, local or 
tribal governments or communities;
(2) create a serious inconsistency or impede action taken by another agency;
(3)  materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan 
programs; or
(4)  raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s 
priorities, or the principles of Executive Order 12866.129
Upon the issuance of Executive Order 12866, the Director of the OMB 
sent a memorandum to all “heads of executive departments and agencies, and 
independent regulatory agencies,” stating that OIRA would have “primary 
responsibility” under the order for a number of “specific regulatory review and 
planning functions.”130 This executive order is remarkable in its heavy-handed, 
wide ranging command, exercising considerable control over a number of 
agencies. This use of Executive Order 12866, particularly in terms of its directions 
to the heads of independent agencies, is an assertion of executive control power 
and an illustration of the degree to which the executive branch has been able 
to exert its influence upon agencies traditionally viewed as outside the scope of 
executive control.
This combination of the president’s control of agency activities by means of 
the appointment power, removal power, and financial oversight— often referred 
to in terms of “financial accountability” and regulatory review and planning—has 
granted the President near complete control over all aspects of the administrative 
machinery of government. This control effectively draws the agencies and their 
activities within the legal and political control of the executive branch. The 
127. Ibid.
128. For a brief overview, see Keith Henderson, “Shrinking the Administrative State: New Public 
Management Before and After 9/11” (2005) 25:1 Revista de Ciencia Politica 271.
129. See Steven Croley, “White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical 
Investigation” (2003) 70:3 U Chicago L Rev 821 at 827.
130. Ibid.
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question that naturally arises with this dramatic increase of executive control 
powers is whether the correlative accountability obligations of the executive have 
also increased.
D. EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
The gradual assumption by the executive of increasing control of agencies has 
not coincided with a corresponding increase in executive branch accountability. 
As Shane notes, presidential accountability for control over agency action is 
ambiguous at best in that:
“[I]t is a striking feature of the unitary executive literature that it gives little sustained 
attention to what “accountability” means. … The point of accountability, by 
definition, must surely be the actual operational capacity of any decision-maker to 
be held to account. It is not at all self-evident that the President is more accountable 
in this sense than other public officials.131
The gradual drawing of the agency into the sphere of the executive branch’s 
legal and political control—without imposing a corresponding accountability 
obligation—has resulted in a functional separation of control and accountability. 
This separation undermines the balance underlying the republican “checks 
and balances” model. Stated differently, on one hand the president has gained 
and is able to exercise considerable legal control, while on the other hand, the 
president is accountable to no one but the electorate—i.e., has only political 
accountability. A further step unbalancing the model comes from the above 
noted myth of agency autonomy or independence that allows the president to 
avoid political accountability. As such, the president is able to assert that agencies 
are independent and hence, they—not he—are to blame for any failure.
The argument of a president’s lack of culpability or purported powerlessness, 
combined with agency culpability, is legitimated on the legal grounds that, 
at law, the agency is indeed an independent legal entity.132 By way of this legal 
demarcation and shift of legal accountability for the agency itself away from the 
executive to the agency, using the legal form of independent legal entity, the 
executive has gained the legal right to sidestep legal accountability. This legal 
demarcation shifts the focus of what would otherwise be citizen scrutiny and 
challenge to the executive’s administration of the law.
131. Peter Shane, “Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of 
Presidential Review of Rulemaking” (1995) 48:1 Ark L Rev 161 at 196.
132. Ibid. See also Nicholas Bagley & Richard L Revesz, “Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State” (2006) 106:6 Colum L Rev 1260; Feaver & Sheehy, “The Political Division of 
Regulatory Labour,” supra note 1.
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The result of being able to sidestep legal accountability is that the elected 
executive is equally able to sidestep political accountability. The argument thus far 
is that, despite the elected executive’s considerable legal and political control over 
the agency, it is able to engage in a blame-shifting exercise133 by which it is able to 
avoid political accountability for matters delegated to agencies, and further, that 
it does so by relying on the myth of agency autonomy. The actual state of affairs 
is that the agency is subject to political control by the executive in discharging 
its mandate. Yet, because of the myth of agency independence, the executive is 
able to accuse the agency for failures of policy, execution, and enforcement when 
convenient and so avoid blame while simultaneously controlling the agency. This 
bold assertion calls for some support.
In the aftermath of the financial turmoil in 2008, the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (the Commission), for example, investigated the actions by 
regulatory agencies and the consequences of their decisions with respect to the 
economic crisis gripping the United States. Among other things, the Commission 
identified the culpable parties, but oddly failed to note, or comment on, the 
missing connection between presidential control and presidential accountability 
for agency action. This point is starkly evident in the Commission’s report (the 
Report), which was submitted in January 2011.134 The Report makes it clear 
that the president has the power to direct policy and administration through the 
appointment and removal of cabinet personnel, such as the treasury secretary, 
as well as the heads of the financial services agencies, such as the Federal Reserve. 
Despite clear malfeasance on the part of successive treasury secretaries, Federal 
Reserve Presidents Greenspan and Bernanke or the New York Federal Reserve 
President Geithner, none of it was linked to the presidents—politically or 
legally.135 This example is but one of many similar instances in which the agency 
has borne the brunt of public criticism and political scrutiny without ever having 
such criticism and scrutiny brought to bear on the ultimate power behind the 
agency—the executive.
Whereas the president and his administration’s superior officers bore the 
ultimate legal sanction of the courts in the traditional configuration of the 
133. See Christopher Hood, “The Risk and the Blame Game” (2002) 37:1 Government 
& Opposition 15.
134. United States, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States, (Washington, DC: United States Government 
Printing Office, 2011).
135. Ibid. There are obvious coordination problems associated with attaching ex post 
responsibility to the executive for policy failure—as was the case with President Bush.
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republican Government model, a different pathway to legal liability arose under 
the agencified model of government. Under the agencified model, the citizen is 
granted rights to bring an action not against the President and his administration, 
but against the agency.136 Where the citizen is successful in obtaining a judgment, 
the sanction and order are against the agency as if it were not part of the executive 
or even the traditional structure of government.137 This configuration provides 
extensive political cover for the elected executive. Not only can the executive 
avoid answering to the public politically for its influence over the decisions of 
agencies, it can avoid answering the public at law because it is able to avoid 
accountability for agency actions before the courts.
As set out above, in the republican model the executive branch gradually 
drew the independent agencies into its sphere of legal and political control. 
However, this gradual acquisition of legal and political control powers was not 
balanced with any corresponding increase in legal and political accountability 
obligations. This situation was a result of the executive’s skillful management 
of opportunities to express its power and the judiciary’s willingness to ensure 
the legislature did not encroach on executive powers. We turn next to examine 
similar phenomena in the responsible government model.
IV. AGENCY CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT MODEL
In countries with responsible government models, constitutional law operates 
differently in terms of executive power and accountability, including power and 
accountability for agencies. For example, the constitution of Canada makes no 
explicit reference to the civil service and as a result, the relationship between the 
executive and its agencies is difficult to explicate in terms of positive constitutional 
law. 138 The independence of the civil service relies on the subtleties of constitutional 
conventions139 within the institutions of Westminster parliaments rather than 
136. See Nixon v Fitzgerald (1982), 457 US 731, 102 S Ct 2690.
137. Actions against the executive are conducted as “citizen suits.” See Adam Babich, “Citizen 
Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation” (1995) 25:1 Envtl L Reporter 10141.
138. This lack of explicit reference is the point of departure for Savoie who is, in turn, criticized 
by Lorne Sossin for ignoring constitutional conventions. See Lorne Sossin, “Speaking Truth 
to Power?: The Search for Bureaucratic Independence in Canada” (2005) 55:1 UTLJ 1 at 1 
[Sossin, “Speaking Truth”].
139. See Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 1991).
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the hard law of written constitutions.140 Indeed, the independence of the civil 
service from the government of the day has been described in the Westminster 
system as follows:
Bureaucratic independence represents a crucial check on the legitimate powers of 
the government of the day to pursue its policy preferences. Given that the executive 
branch of Canadian governments is the repository of immense power, sporadic 
supervision, and relatively scant public scrutiny, the internal dynamics by which this 
power may be constrained become crucial to the integrity of responsible government 
and the rule of law.141
Thus, the separation of executive accountability obligations from executive 
control powers over the agencies in the Westminster model followed a different 
path. Instead of the executive drawing the agency into its sphere of legal control, 
as found in the republican model, the executive pursued a different strategy 
in maximizing control while simultaneously minimizing its accountability 
obligations.142 Its strategic focus has been on the politicization of the civil service, 
including, of course, the agency.143 The core power of the executive is derived 
at least partly from the sovereign prerogative powers. The “little separation of 
powers” doctrine, which allowed the responsible government model to avoid 
some of the coordination problems posed by the stricter republican separation of 
powers doctrine144, allowed this different path. From the outset, the Westminster 
system allowed a strong executive through the institution of Cabinet, described 
140. See Sossin, “Speaking Truth”, supra note 138.
141. Ibid at 5-6.
142. See Feaver & Sheehy, “The Shifting Balance,” supra note 2.
143. See B Guy Peters & Jon Pierre, eds, Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative 
Perspective: The Quest for Control (New York: Routledge, 2004); Christopher Hood & 
Martin Lodge, The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and 
Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Kathy MacDermott, Whatever Happened 
to Frank and Fearless? The Impact of New Public Management on the Australian Public 
Service (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008); Bradley E Wright, “Public Service and Motivation: 
Does Mission Matter?” (2007) 67:1 Pub Admin Rev 54; John Stone, “The Degradation of 
the Public Service” (2011) 55:7&8 Quadrant 36.
144. Indeed, Chief Justice McLachlin stated that administrative tribunals “may be seen 
as spanning the constitutional divide between the executive and judicial branches of 
government.” See Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control 
and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC 52 at para 24, [2001] 2 SCR 781. See Pauline German, 
“Separation of Powers: Contrasting the British and Australian Experiences” (2006) 13:1 
eLaw J 141 at 143. According to German, the High Court in Victorian Stevedoring & 
General Contracting Co Pty Ltd & Meakes v Dignan held that, notwithstanding the separation 
demarcated by the three different chapters of the constitution, “a strict division of powers 
between the executive and legislature was not practical.”
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by Bagehot as “a close union, nearly the complete fusion, of the executive and 
legislative power…[which is] while it lasts and holds together, the most powerful 
body in the State.”145
A. EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF AGENCIES
The prerogative powers of government in the responsible government model, 
which are the legacy of the battle for sovereign powers in the United Kingdom, 
provide the foundation for the executive right to wield legal and political control 
powers over agencies.146 The scope of these powers is plenary and subject only 
to limitations imposed by Parliament.147 This prerogative power is the source of 
a very important distinction in responsible government between the executive’s 
authority to direct agency action and the agency’s power to manage its own 
operational activities.148 For example, in Australia, the New South Wales Public 
Sector Management Act 2002 reads, “the ordinary and necessary departmental 
authority of a Minister with respect to the direction and control of staff is not 
limited by anything in this Act.”149 As a consequence, unlike what was seen in the 
republican model, there has been no need for the executive to contest the status 
of agencies and compete with the legislative or judicial branches of government 
for control over the agencies or to try to draw agencies into the scope of executive 
control. The agency is firmly within the grasp of the minister. The issue is better 
145. The English Constitution, 2d ed (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) at 9-13.
146. In Canada and Australia, the prerogative power to direct and control the public service is 
subsumed in section 3 of the British North America Act and section 61 of the Australian 
Constitution, which provides that executive power derives some of its content by reference 
to the Crown prerogatives. See British North America Act, 1867, (UK) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, 
s 3. See also An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia, 1900 (UK) 63 & 64 Vic c 
12, s 61. One such prerogative power is the rights vested in the Crown through its Ministers 
to “direct and control” the civil service. For example, the New South Wales Public Sector 
Management Act reads: “the ordinary and necessary departmental authority of a Minister 
with respect to the direction and control of staff is not limited by anything in this Act.” As a 
consequence, there has been no need for the executive to contest the status of agencies and 
compete with the legislative or judicial branches of government for control or to pursue a 
strategy to draw agencies into the scope of executive control. See Public Sector Employment 
and Management Act 2002 (NSW), s 161 [Public Sector Act].
147. See Davis v Commonwealth, [1988] HCA 63 at para 35, 166 CLR 79.
148. See Phillippe Lagassé, “Parliamentary and Judicial Ambivalence Toward Executive Prerogative 
Powers in Canada” (2012) 55:2 Can Pub Admin 157. In the republican model, there is 
a potential to contest and require submission to another branch of government. In the 
responsible government model, this potential does not exist. Power resides with the executive 
as a manifestation of its prerogative powers.
149. Public Sector Act, supra note 145.
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framed as a matter of agency independence, which—as Lorne Sossin argues—is 
understood as an aspect of the rule of law.150
The distinction between executive direction and agency management 
provides the foundation for the political strategy that underpins the use of 
the agencified model in the regulatory state. Under this model, it is clear that 
“government has withdrawn from the control of operational detail in statutory 
[agencies]… entrusting such control to senior public sector management.”151 
At the same time, the executive “still requires devices such as the ministerial 
direction in order to exercise control over this detail as the need arises.”152 
In other words, the apparent distinction between direction and management—i.e., 
political and legal control versus managerial autonomy—is a strategic device 
capable of use by the executive in the agency.
Beginning with the proposition that the responsible government’s format 
for granting independence to its regulatory bodies observes “the distinction 
between policy and operational issues,”153 the question that arises is  not how 
much managerial autonomy agencies will be granted—they are granted almost 
total managerial control. Instead, the question is how much autonomy from 
ministerial control via directions, political and patronage appointments,154 and 
other means will agencies be granted? The answer to this question is complicated 
by the important distinction between the executive’s ability to exercise formal 
legal control, as distinguished from informal political control. As a consequence, 
determining agency autonomy by evaluating the amount of legal control 
statutorily granted to a minister is an analysis that concerns itself with only 
half of the control power held by the executive.
The other half is evident when one evaluates agency autonomy in terms 
of political control—a manifestly more difficult task.155 The executive is able to 
150. “Speaking Truth”, supra note 116 at 44-46.
151. Austl, Commonwealth, Information and Research Services, Ministerial Directions to 
Statutory Corporations (Research Paper No 7) by Christos Mantziaris (Department of the 
Parliamentary Library, 1998) at 7.
152. Ibid, citing Mark Aronson, “Ministerial Directions: The Battle of the Prerogatives” (1995) 
6:1 Pub L Rev 77 at 88.
153. Mark Aronson, “Government Liability in Negligence” (2008) 32:44 Melbourne University 
Law Rev 44 at 54.
154. See Sossin, “Speaking Truth,” supra note 138 at 10.
155. See Matthew D McCubbins, Roger G Noll & Barry R Weingast, “Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control” (1987) 3:2 JL Econ & Org 243; Matthew 
D McCubbins, Roger G Noll & Barry R Weingast, “Structure and Process, Politics 
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies” (1989) 
75:2 Va L Rev 431.
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apply a range of less transparent, informal means to exercise this political control. 
Further, the efficacy of these informal methods of political control is markedly 
more difficult to identify, let alone measure—a “muddle” that has long been 
recognized in Canada.156 One important means of distinguishing formal legal 
and informal political executive control of agency activities is examination of the 
agency’s organizational form. The executive is able to select an agency form that 
delivers the type and amount of control it wishes to exercise and the type (legal 
or political) of accountability it is willing to accept. Its choice of the agency’s legal 
form is limited to the four following options: non-statutory (executive) agency, 
statutory agency, statutory corporation, or government business enterprise 
(Crown corporation).157 Each type has different levels of legal autonomy and is 
subject to different types of political and legal control.158 Briefly, the greater the 
agency’s legal autonomy, the more the executive exercises its control via political 
means, and the less the legal autonomy, the less the executive exercises control 
via political means.
1. EXECUTIVE LEGAL CONTROL
The legal control of agencies through the use of formal legal mechanisms is 
limited to those mechanisms explicitly identified in the legislation that creates an 
agency.159 The most prevalent form of legal control is the ministerial direction. 
156. See H N Janisch, “The Role of the Independent Regulatory Agency in Canada” (1978) 27 
UNBLJ 83. In comparing the concept of the “independent” agency in the Commonwealth 
countries, Janisch sums up the general position in referring to the status of independent 
agencies in Canada:
Canada never completely adopted the American model of an independent regulatory agency, 
although it has, on occasion, gone far in that direction. This hesitation is of central importance 
for an understanding of current regulatory issues in this country. Indeed, the history of 
regulation in Canada has been largely a constant process of working out the tensions inherent 
to our commitment to parliamentary responsibility and the need for regulatory tribunals 
which fall to some degree outside the sphere of immediate political control (ibid at 87).
157. See Feaver & Sheehy, “The Shifting Balance,” supra note 2 at 223.
158. See Austl, Commonwealth, Information and Research Services, Government Business 
Enterprises and Public Accountability through Parliament (Research Paper No 18) by Stephen 
Bottomley (Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2001).
159. See Lorne Sossin, “The Ambivalence of Executive Power in Canada” in Paul Craig & Adam 
Tompkins, eds, The Executive and Public Law: Power and Accountability in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Lorne Sossin, “The Puzzle of 
Independence for Administrative Bodies” (2008) 26:1 NJCL 1. See also Philip Bryden, 
“How to Achieve Tribunal Independence: A Canadian Perspective” (Paper delivered at the 
9th AIJA Annual Conference, Perth, 7 April 2006), online: <www.aija.org.au/Tribs06/
papers/Bryden.pdf>; Arthurs, supra note 7.
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The ministerial direction is a legal power bestowed on ministers to direct an 
agency to take a particular decision or to adopt a particular interpretation of a 
policy or of a strategy. The powers granted to a minister to direct may be general 
or specific. For example, the Australian Broadcasting Services Act 1992 grants the 
minister both a general power of notification and a specific power of direction.160
Where the legislature gives the executive a legal power to control, summed 
up by Mantziaris as a “power [that] might extend to all of the activities of the 
[agency], a specified range of activities, or specific transactions,”161 the power is 
wide in scope, deep, and practically without limitation. As noted in the Uhrig 
Review, the lack of specificity and clarity of powers is clearly problematic. 
John Uhrig found 
a lack of effective governance for several of the authorities considered by the review 
due to several factors including unclear boundaries in their delegation, a lack of 
clarity in their relationships with Ministers and portfolio departments, and a lack of 
accountability for the exercise of their power.162 
This lack of clarity is exacerbated by the unclear boundary between legal control 
powers and political control powers, an issue to which we turn next.
2. EXECUTIVE POLITICAL CONTROL
Informal political control of agencies by the executive takes several forms.163 
Beyond the fundamental political control that comes from the fact that the head 
of the civil service, who has the power to appoint agency heads, holds his or her 
position “at the pleasure” of the government of the day,164 the most prevalent 
form of political control is informal communication between Ministers and 
agency heads. Such informal communications may establish de facto political 
control that occurs in a “zone of moral and legal uncertainty.”165 This zone of 
uncertainty is a zone in which the agency mandate may contradict the minister’s 
strategic political objectives, leaving the agency in a quandary. Is it to pursue 
its public mandate as set out in its enabling legislation? Or is it to respond to 
the minister’s political directives? Although various answers to this question have 
160. (Cth) at s 160.
161. Mantziaris, supra note 151 at i.
162. Review of the Corporate Governance of Statutory Authorities and Office Holders (Canberra: 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2003) at 5.
163. See Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia, [1997] FCA 558, 146 
ALR 1 [Hughes].
164. Sossin, “Speaking Truth,” supra note 138 at 56.
165. Mantziaris, supra note 151 at i.
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been proposed, the core issue of ensuring executive accountability for agency 
action is ultimately a matter of political will and indeed, good will and good faith 
in dealings with the machinery of responsible government.166
Making agencies more responsive to ministers is a key objective of the New 
Public Management (NPM) reform program.167 Responsiveness to ministers is 
ensconced in the broader discussion about government reform, which is focused 
on making agencies more responsive to citizens or, in the language of NPM, 
“customers.”168 While the theory is clear—i.e., accountability is to the minister169 
and can contribute in turn to ministerial accountability in its own right170—the 
reality of a politicized public service, personal loyalties to a minister who may 
have had involvement in the appointment process or ongoing supervision, and 
self-interest of a careerist agency CEO, may lead to different outcomes.
A more potent but subtle means by which the executive has been successful in 
gaining political control of agencies has been by its use of statutory corporations 
and government business enterprises.171 These two legal forms create an arm’s 
length legal relationship between government and the agency, but they do not 
necessarily loosen a tight political rein. Political reins may continue through 
appointment powers, power to set key performance indicators, and budget 
allocations. For example, a minister may have the right to appoint the CEO of a 
statutory corporation, have the power to appoint some or all of the members of 
the board of directors, or be a shareholder of the corporation.172 In such instances, 
while the minister may not have direct legal control powers, such as through a 
power to issue ministerial directions, powers of appointment allow the creation 
166. See Sossin, “Speaking Truth,” supra note 138 at 56.
167. See MacDermott, supra note 143 at 2.
168. See Christopher Hood & Guy Peters, “The Middle Aging of New Public Management: Into 
the Age of Paradox?” (2004) 14:3 J Pub Admin Research & Theory 267; George A Larbi, 
The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States (Geneva: United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development, 1999); Brian Dollery & Chang W Lee, “New Public 
Management and Convergence in Public Administrative Systems: A Comparison between 
Australia and the Republic of Korea” (2004) 9:1 J Econ & Soc Pol’y 1.
169. Australia’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts statement summarized by Bottomley as 
“staff in a GBE are accountable to management who are in turn accountable to the board of 
directors. The directors, individually and collectively, are accountable to the relevant portfolio 
minister who, in turn, is accountable to Parliament for the performance of GBEs in that 
portfolio.” Supra note 135 at iii.
170. See Sossin, “Speaking Truth,” supra note 138 at 5.
171. See Feaver & Sheehy, “The Political Division of Regulatory Labour,” supra note 1 at 177.
172. See Bottomley, supra note 158 at 5.
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of significant personal loyalty to the minister and hence provide a clear avenue 
for political control.
While the separate legal entity doctrine of corporate law might appear to 
sever the political levers of power, company law norms regulating informal control 
are difficult to apply in the case of statutory agencies for three reasons. First, and 
most importantly, company law is part of private law, whereas statutory bodies 
and some government business enterprises are generally governed by public 
law.173 These bodies of law are markedly different and largely incommensurate.174 
Accordingly, application of the private law of directors’ duties to statutory 
corporations and government enterprises is inappropriate.
Second, the variable structure of the statutory corporation and the range of 
ministerial discretions are incompatible with the singular organization of directors 
and members and their limited rights and duties in limited liability companies. 
Whereas corporations limited by shares have a clear and well-established structure, 
statutory corporations, as creatures of statute, can be organized as the legislature 
sees fit. Third, the norms and duties placed on limited liability companies are at 
odds in many instances with the public duties that may be required of statutory 
bodies. Thus, looking to company law for restraints on ministerial control in 
statutory authorities is simply misguided.
Taking the analysis one step further, however, there may be some limitations 
on the executive’s ability to set up and operate a government business enterprise 
using a company limited by shares. As we have argued elsewhere:
Where ministers are de facto controllers of such companies, they will be liable to 
statutory and common law directors’ duties as shadow directors. The remedies 
provided might be useful in dealing with ministers so acting; however, the court’s 
conservative application of the rules in company law cases generally suggests that 
such rules may be expected to have little impact on the actions of government 
appointees.175
173. See Gerald Frug, “The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law” (1984) 97:6 Harv 
L Rev 1276. The exception is the companies limited by shares, where the government 
controls a limited liability company—but not its subsidiary. In these cases, standard 
corporate legal duties apply. See Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cth), 
s 34 [Commonwealth Authorities].
174. See Arthurs, supra note 7 at 29.
175. Feaver & Sheehy, “The Political Division of Regulatory Labour”, supra note 1 at 172.
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Further, such judicially applied legal controls may be of limited value where 
the company claims commercial confidentiality,176 providing the executive 
with cover, or where the activities in question are conducted by a subsidiary 
free of government accountability protocols established under legislation.177 
In these cases, political control triumphs over legal accountability. Once again, 
executive control powers are not balanced by executive accountability obligations 
in the agencified responsible government model, an issue we next examine in 
greater detail.178
B. EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY
Whereas the degree of the executive’s legal control powers is explicitly set by 
statute, the degree of legal accountability of the executive for agency activity may 
be explicit or implicit, depending again on the legal organizational form, among 
other things. In responsible government countries, agencies as public bodies 
fall under the remit of a particular minister. Hence, the core accountability 
question is whether the accountability obligation embodied in the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility balances the control power.179 Mantziaris observes, “[to] 
the extent that [an agency] is independent, there is no ministerial responsibility 
for the authority. It is for Parliament to determine the manner and extent of 
its accountability.”180 Although in some instances there may be a clear line of 
authority,181 the evidence is that over time, the executive has increasingly withheld 
from Parliament information about the activities of agencies it controls.182 And 
senior bureaucrats, dependent on the goodwill of their ministers, have aided 
176. Valarie Sands, “The Right to Know and Obligation to Provide: Public Private Partnerships, 
Public Knowledge, Public Accountability, Public Disenfranchisement and Prison Cases” 
(2006) 29:3 UNSW LJ 334.
177. See Bottomley, supra note 158 at 10-11.
178. See Commonwealth Authorities, supra note 150 at s 34. This section exempts subsidiaries from 
accountability obligations under Part 4 of the same Act.
179. This is a matter that has troubled a number of public administration scholars. See Paul 
Finn, “The Abuse of Public Power in Australia: Making our Governors our Servants” (1994) 
43:1 Pub L Rev 43; Michael Cole, “Quangos: UK Ministerial Responsibility in Theory and 
Practice” (2000) 15:3 Pub Pol’y & Admin 32; Linda English & James Guthrie “Mandate, 
Independence and Funding: Resolution of a Protracted Struggle Between Parliament 
and the Executive Over the Powers of the Australian Auditor-General” 59:1 Australian 
J Pub Admin 98.
180. Mantziaris, supra note 151at 12.
181. See e.g. Bottomley, supra note 158 at iii.
182. R Paul Wilson, “Minister’s Caucus Advisory Committees Under the Harper Government” 
(2015) 58:2 Can Pub Admin 227.
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ministers in obscuring agency activities. Perhaps there is no better example than 
the statement of former Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien in response to 
a judicial inquiry into corruption in his government: “I am responsible but I am 
not to blame.”183
The legislature’s power to separate control power and accountability 
obligations and treat them as distinct and severable is noted in academic opinion. 
Finn and Lindell suggest in the Australian context that it is “within the province 
of Parliament in allocating functions to non-departmental agencies, to override 
that principle in a particular legislative scheme if that scheme falls within a 
head of [federal] legislative power.”184 The principle referred to is that of vesting 
responsibility for the statutory authority in the government—i.e., there was no 
need to have ministerial responsibility for any particular agency.
The principle of ministerial responsibility has no necessary part to play in 
the creation of independent statutory authorities. Rather, it is for parliament 
to “ordain the nature and limits of the authority’s independence from and 
accountability to Parliament.”185 In other words, if Parliament decides to create 
agencies without ministerial accountability, it is free to do so, and the primary 
way of doing so in the regulatory state is through the choice of legal form.186 
Indeed, some public administration scholars have advocated this separation, 
arguing that “traditional vertical methods of accountability would destroy the 
‘autonomy, flexibility, user-responsiveness and subsidiarity’” that make the agency 
an important innovation facilitating the efficacy of government.187
The view that Parliament is free to determine accountability as it sees fit 
is consistent with Lord Wilberforce’s statement in British Steel v Granada 
Television that:
[A]s regards the British Steel Corporation, the conduct of its affairs and the disclosures 
and reports which have to be made, are, as one would expect of a public body, 
regulated by statute, now by the Iron and Steel Act 1975. The legitimate interest of 
the public in knowing about its affairs is given effect to through information which 
183. See Savoie, supra note 31 at 257-89.
184. Paul Finn & Geoffrey Lindell, “The Accountability of Statutory Authorities”, in Senate 
Standing Committee on Finance and Government Operations, Statutory Authorities of the 
Commonwealth: Fifth Report (1982), Appendix 4.
185. Ibid.
186. See Feaver & Sheehy, “The Political Division of Regulatory Labour”, supra note 1 at 165; 
Bottomley, supra note 158 at 13.
187. CC Hood & GF Schuppert, “Evaluation and Review” in CC Hood & GF Schuppert, eds, 
Delivering Public Services in Western Europe (London: Sage, 1988) 246 at 254, cited in Cole, 
supra note 155 at 33.
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is a statutory duty to publish and through reports to the Secretary of State who is 
responsible to Parliament.188
The Australian High Court followed the British Steel decision in the Lange 
case, in which it extended the Federal Court’s decision in Hughes Aircraft 
Systems International v Airservices Australia, signaling that in interpreting 
the accountability of statutory corporations, courts should be guided by 
constitutional considerations.189 Although this might appear to be an extension 
of the classical constitutional accountability framework to agencies situated 
outside the constitutional core of government, the extension comes with a critical 
qualification. In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, the court looked to 
constitutional considerations rather than limiting itself to the enabling legislation 
to interpret the provision.190 The purposive approach to interpretation was given 
a larger foundation than the specific piece of legislation. In Hughes, the court 
declared that where a minister is granted no legal control or supervisory authority 
over a body, it logically follows that no accountability is expected. There are two 
problems with the approach taken by the courts. First, the courts recognize only 
legal control and ignore political control, though they are certainly not ignorant 
of it. Second, the courts identify two distinct lines of accountability. The first 
line is the traditional line of ministerial accountability. The second line is a direct 
line of accountability to Parliament by-passing the minister altogether. In Lange, 
the High Court of Australia stated, “the conduct of the executive branch is not 
confined to Ministers and the public service. It includes the affairs of statutory 
authorities and public utilities which are obliged to report to the legislature or 
to a Minister who is responsible to the legislature.”191 That is, an agency may 
be accountable directly to Parliament, bypassing a minister entirely.192 As a 
consequence, a minister may have no legal accountability for an agency, yet 
still be able to exercise political control over agency policymaking—a complete 
separation of accountability and control.
This structuring of accountability and control powers upsets the traditional 
configuration of the responsible government model. In the traditional model, 
the ministers bore the ultimate legal sanction of the courts. Under the agencified 
188. [1981] AC 1096 at 1169, [1980] 3 WLR 774.
189. Hughes, supra note 163.
190. [1997] HCA 25 at 208, 4 LRC 192.
191. Ibid at para 48.
192. A third mode not identified by the court arises where an agency may be accountable to both 
a Minister and the legislature.
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model, as we have seen, this accountability rule no longer holds.193 As with the 
republican model transformed by the interposition of the agency, citizens are 
no longer empowered to bring an action against the minister; rather, they must 
exercise their rights against an agency. Again, the result is that where the citizen 
is successful in obtaining a judgment, the sanction and order are against the 
agency—as if it were not part of the executive.
This configuration provides extensive political cover for the elected executive 
and it allows the executive to avoid both public political accountability for 
its control of the agencies, as well as legal accountability before the courts. 
Such political tactics undermine the citizen-state relationship and should be a 
concern to scholars and citizens alike, as elections are rarely single issue events.194 
We consider these implications next.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE SEVERANCE OF CONTROL AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY
The separation of control and accountability under the agencified model 
of government has enormous implications for government and democracy. 
It is clear that the failure to attend to the balance between executive control and 
executive accountability in the regulatory state’s agencified model has facilitated 
a re-distribution of power and enabled the executive branch to both dominate 
government and simultaneously avoid accountability in unprecedented ways. 
In a speech on the rule of law in 1997, Justice Mason, then the President of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, observed that during his tenure as the New 
South Wales Attorney General between 1987 and 1997, the core of government 
“shrank as many governmental functions were outsourced or placed under the 
oversight of statutory corporations operating under charters obliging them to act 
commercially with little or no ongoing formal executive oversight.”195 He went 
on to note that use of statutory corporations had diminished legal control of 
the administration to such a degree that many of the basic premises of the rule 
193. See Michael Cole, “Quangos: UK Ministerial Responsibility in Theory and Practice” (2000) 
15:3 Pub Pol’y Admin 32. See references in Woodhouse, supra note 44. See also references in 
Thompson & Tillotsen, supra note 44.
194. See Georgy Egorov, “Single-Issue Campaigns and Multidimensional Politics” (2015) 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 21265.
195. Justice Keith Mason, “The Rule of Law, Judicial Review and the Public-Private Divide” 
(Forum Address delivered at Testing the Boundaries of New Zealand’s Public Law Domain, 
Wellington Town Hall, 20 March 2006), online: <www.supremecourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/
Documents/mason_speeches.pdf >.
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of law were under threat. This view is echoed by Bottomley who, citing Justice 
Finn, notes that “[e]xecutive-driven monitoring of the corporate planning and 
performance appraisal processes and the weakening of Parliamentary control and 
accountability” illustrate this shifting balance.196 While there is a clear, pragmatic 
reason for having agency executives appear before parliament and answer to the 
press, these practices undermine executive accountability. The agency executives 
are acting under orders and guidance from the executive, whether minister or 
president; they are neither answerable to parliament nor to the press. Rather, they 
are directly and appropriately answerable to those instructing them.
As a constitutional law doctrine and as a part of democratic theory, the rule 
of law requires the executive to be accountable at law for its administration of 
government. The issue Mason identified is that the executive’s ability to exercise 
political control without legal accountability undermines the rule of law. In a rule 
of law state, the executive cannot escape the review of the courts, leaving the 
citizens without remedy. How can a citizen ruled by an unfair, overreaching, 
biased, or corrupt executive and lacking recourse to the courts be said to be living 
in a country that adheres to the rule of law principle?
As we have argued, in the regulatory state, executive control of agencies—and 
in particular executive political control—is not necessarily tied to corresponding 
accountability obligations. To the extent that legal and political rights and 
obligations parallel each other, they do so only because the legislature has so 
decided. Political accountability is subverted by law. As noted by Ian Thynne, 
“The problem lies partly in the unwillingness of governments to keep parliaments 
informed of company activities, though it also lies in the inability of parliaments 
to sustain the questioning of responsible ministers.”197 More insidious, therefore, 
than the legislature’s tacit complicity in allowing the executive to choose the 
organizational forms that facilitate the refusal to answer, is its refusal to press 
the executive when no answer is forthcoming from the government to questions 
put to it by the Opposition in Question Period. In other words, all political 
parties that have a realistic prospect of forming the government are complicit and 
prepared to compromise the integrity of the parliamentary system in order to reap 
the gains of the separation of accountability and control in the agencified model.
In the United States, Professor Froomkin describes the problem in the 
following manner: 
196. Bottomley, supra note 158, citing Paul Finn, “The Abuse of Public Power in Australia: 
Making our Governors our Servants” (1994) 5:1 Pub L Rev 43.
197. “The Incorporated Company as an Instrument of Government: A Quest for a Comparative 
Understanding” (1994) 7:1 Governance 59 at 77.
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The obscurity in which federal government corporations operate allows them to 
have the best of both worlds and to avoid both the accountability mechanisms 
designed to rein in government and the laws and rules that regulate private firms. 
Congress has failed to come to grips with these issues.”198 
In other words, the same set of circumstances that prevail in the Westminster 
responsible government model prevails also in the American republican context.
In short, the executive has been able, through agency selection, among 
other means, to effectively adjust the degree of legal control it wishes to exercise 
over a given agency and the amount and type of accountability it is willing to 
absorb. Though it is often assumed that the degree of legal control determines 
the corresponding degree of accountability obligations, this is not necessarily so. 
Where the executive considers either political or legal accountability undesirable—
as in the case where the executive is exposed to hostility for unpopular policy—or 
where legal control is potentially harmful, the executive can create an agency for 
which it is not legally accountable while still wielding political control.199 In sum, 
the creation of the agency allows for the establishment and maintenance of an 
accountability deficit.
A further consequence of agencification of the regulatory state is the shifting 
of oversight responsibilities for delivery of public goods and services away from 
the executive to courts and Parliament, as in the case of statutory corporations. 
The agencified model allows politically unpopular service decisions or failures 
in provision to be blamed squarely on the agency and privatized providers. This 
allocation of blame enables the government of the day to avoid political blame 
for those services and failures at the ballot box.200
From the perspectives of constitutional law and democratic theory, the 
agencified model of government is distinguished from the responsible and 
republican models of government by the collapse of three critical democratic 
institutions that imbue those constitutions: the separation of powers, executive 
and ministerial responsibility, and political accountability. In the place of 
these institutions and related constitutional doctrines of organization and 
accountability, the agencified model substitutes a very narrow avenue of legal 
accountability by way of judicial review of administrative action in agencies. 
In other words, accountability has been reduced from a range of public 
198. A Michael Froomkin, “Reinventing the Government Corporation” (1995) 1995:3 U Ill L 
Rev 543 at 632.
199. See Christopher Hood, The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy and Self-Preservation in 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010) at 24-43.
200. Ibid.
SHEEHY, FEAVER,  ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE AGENCY 221
mechanisms via Parliament to the single, narrow, expensive judicial remedy of 
administrative litigation. This shift from political accountability to exclusive legal 
accountability, by way of judicial review, poses a unique challenge to democratic 
theory, which relies ultimately on political accountability. Further, this narrowing 
similarly denies citizens access to the courts on an increasing range of matters 
obscured by agency structure under the political control of the executive. 
The agencified model also changes the structure of control powers. Rather than 
granting legal control to the executive and having political control hammered out 
in the political institutions designed for such—i.e., parliaments, congresses, and 
ultimately elections—the agencified model circumvents political discourse and 
allocates political debate and accountability to technocratic and market discourse. 
The courts are ill equipped to deal with these discourses, even if they were not 
institutionally constrained from most of such discourse in the first instance.201 In 
other words, courts are not the correct forum for discussion of government policy 
and furthermore, have no expertise in developing or challenging policy.
Finally, the agencified model allows the executive to escape significant 
legal and political accountability while leaving substantial legal and political 
controls in its hands.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the simultaneous worldwide shift to a less accountable executive operating 
an agencified state, the path is not a single trajectory. As we have demonstrated, 
the path differs in republican and responsible government models.202 In the 
republican model, the agency was a solution to problems resulting from a strict 
separation of powers doctrine. In the Westminster countries, the agency arose as 
the government sought to achieve efficiencies and efficacy first in the coordinated 
201. See Michael M Harmon, “The Simon/Waldo Debate: A Review and Update” (1989) 12:4 
Pub Admin Q 437. See also Richard J Stillman II, “Review Article: Dwight Waldo’s The 
Administrative State: A Neglected American Administrative State Theory for our Times” 
(2008) 86:2 Pub Admin 581.
202. See Tom Christensen & Per Lægreid, “Regulatory Reforms and Agencification” (Paper 
delivered at the ECPR Conference, Budapest, 8-10 September 2005), online: <regulation.
upf.edu/ecpr-05-papers/tchristensen.pdf>.
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delivery of collective solutions, next in the development of the welfare state, and 
later on in its dismantling.203
These different paths, have, however, had remarkable and markedly similar 
effects on society and government. It is clear to many scholars and observers that 
the executive has become “hyper-powered.” This powerful executive, we have 
argued, is insufficiently accountable and is so by design. The corollaries of a 
hyper-powered executive are a disempowered legislature, a politicized civil service, 
204 and arguably an increasingly disenfranchised and disengaged electorate.205
Yet, these are not the only outcomes. The executive has not only benefited 
from the agencified model but has also suffered certain costs. Over time, the 
agencies, by their simple prevalence, become self-justifying. An institutional 
path dependency develops—a justification for their existence. And important 
issues, such as the novel approach to control and accountability identified and 
analyzed in this article, become harder to identify as they are submerged by the 
institutionalization, or broad unquestioning acceptance of the agency form. 
As Christensen observes, “Autonomous regulatory agencies emerge because it 
is taken for granted that they are the most appropriate organizational form.”206 
Using them, he argues, may “enhance the legitimacy of a decision to privatize, 
by distracting attention from more substantive concerns. … The agency form is 
established simply because it has become the norm.”207
In other words, the original justifications of efficiency and effectiveness 
have now gone, and executive accountability for agency action has withered 
simply because it is the “way we do things around here” (i.e., it has become 
institutionalized).
These issues are not merely some hobbyhorse of academics. The agencified 
model of government has hobbled normative debate about a government’s 
policy agenda, public policy generally, the public service and public goods and 
203. See Wolfgang Steek & Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economics” in Wolfgang Steek & Kathleen Thelen, eds, Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) 1.
204. See Christopher Hood & Martin Lodge, The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, 
Competency, Loyalty – and Blame (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); MacDermott, 
supra note 143; Bradley E Wright, “Public Service and Motivation: Does Mission 
Matter?” (2007) 67:1 Pub Admin Rev 54; John Stone, “The Degradation of the Public 
Service” Quadrant (1 July 2011) 36, online: <quadrant.org.au/magazine/2011/07-08/
the-degradation-of-the-public-service/>.
205. While there are certainly a wide variety of reasons, this may be an additional reason.
206. Supra note 202 at 25.
207. Ibid.
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services. This muting of political debate unfolds as the agencies’ techno-political 
determinations extend more and more. It insulates from debate such questions 
as social goals to be pursued, democratic processes by which such goals will be 
pursued, and ultimately even the ideals a society holds for itself and the role of its 
government in realizing these ideals. Again, Christensen identifies the issue: The 
agencified model “with autonomous agencies as its main organizational form, 
will represent a less positive state, encourage the hollowing out of the state, and 
weaken social goals.”208
The severing of control and accountability does nothing to halt that trajectory. 
To the contrary, it facilities both a hyper-powered executive and the stifling of 
political debate. As the main mechanism of the regulatory state, the agency 
contributes to what leading public policy scholar Bruce Doern describes as that 
“dense regulatory complexity [that]… produces a lack of accountability, cynicism 
in political life, and a lack of respect for democratic political institutions.”209 
David Hamer, a former member of both the upper and lower houses in Australia 
observed, “[The electorate] generally are not very impressed with politics, but 
they tend to blame their politicians rather than their political systems.”210 It 
may well be time to reconsider these systems, and look for new ways to take 
back control of the executive by reimposing accountability for the agency and 
reigniting relevant and engaged democratic debate.
In summary, agencies are critical in advancing the various political agendas 
of the government of the day and despite their supposed independence, they are 
quite subject to ministerial control. The agencification of government has occurred 
with good reason. The logics of specialization and efficiency in the highly technical 
environment of contemporary society make administration by non-specialists 
unviable. Governments of all the jurisdictions considered here have adopted 
the agencification model to such an extent that the agencies are too numerous 
and large for the executive to hold primary and singular accountability. Yet, the 
executive is still able to exercise significant control over its agencies. As a result, 
there is both a pragmatic logic to the separation of accountability and control 
and a pernicious aspect in the strategic opportunity it presents. Undoubtedly the 
strategists for the elected government will seek out and exploit the separation. 
That is what this article seeks to identity. Problematically, from a practical point 
of view, this makes effective, democratic accountability—whether via elections or 
the institution of ministerial responsibility—a dubious prospect. Perhaps more 
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critically, from the perspective of both constitutional law and democratic theory, 
new and innovative solutions need to be developed that can be adopted within 
the institutional framework of the legal systems of the common law world. 
This is, however, a topic for another article.211
211. John Ackerman has made some steps in that direction. See “Understanding 
Independent”, supra note 49.
